Yes, a straight 300, not a B300, which is the 350.

Blaming all the pilots, at least 10 such cases in recent years, who have died because of this issue is stupid. There is clearly a critical flaw in the King Air such that the first 20 seconds of flight comes with a huge risk that far exceeds other aircraft.

The pilots who died were generally not inexperienced, either.

If a plane kills people in such a specific way, so many times with nearly identical accident descriptions, you have to conclude there is a problem here.

The whole point of the machine is to NOT create critical situations that kill people. The King Air is failing to do that.

Mike C.

Sure, perhaps the pilots screwed up. But before the pilot could screw up, the plane had to perform an uncommanded change in power settings (assuming this is all PLM). Why not fix the plane AND train the pilots better? Historically, looks like planes are easier to fix than pilots.

Fail safe is better than fail dangerous. Fixing the plane once is going to be cheaper and more effective than trying to fix all the pilots who fly it ever after, and keeping them fixed. Sooner or later, lots (Most? All?) pilots are going to experience a skill level migration (brain fart, in the trade...)

As I read over our checklist, which I admittedly created myself (sinful I know), I don't see anything that would kill you if you missed it.

MU2s crashed due to tired pilots doing all sorts of stupid stuff when they were flying checks overnight. In one period of time, 10 of 11 crashes were 135 overnight cargo runs, single pilot, between the hours of 10pm and 7 am.

As soon as that usage stopped, the crash rate dropped significantly.

The crashes did not occur in one very specific phase of flight like the King Airs, and not from one specific defect. If the MU2 had one such specific defect, it would have been addressed.

Your attempt at deflection missed.

Mike C.

The plane performed an uncommanded change in power because the system design created that risk.

This meant the accident was only ONE FAULT from happening, which relied solely on a human getting it right every time. This is not good design.

The attitude you are displaying suggests we should never have stall warnings systems, or gear warning horns, or takeoff configuration systems, or any of the other safety systems which are there to help the pilot catch their mistakes. How stupid would that be to remove those systems?

Mike C.

The plane performed an uncommanded change in power because the system design created that risk.

This meant the accident was only ONE FAULT from happening, which relied solely on a human getting it right every time. This is not good design.

The attitude you are displaying suggests we should never have stall warnings systems, or gear warning horns, or takeoff configuration systems, or any of the other safety systems which are there to help the pilot catch their mistakes. How stupid would that be to remove those systems?

Mike C.

Not true.

The human is the first fault, but the gear warning horn is the second. The system backs up the human.


Which you then use to excuse a bad design of the airplane.

"Who is to blame?" is the wrong question. "How do we prevent this in the future?" is the right question. Safety is not about finding blame, it is about avoiding an accident in as many ways as possible.

It is clear the King Air is not doing that, leaving you just one small and common mistake from a horrific crash.

This discussion all came about because runway distances were being compared between King Air, Piaggio, and Citations. The turboprop numbers are generally without engine failures, the Citation numbers include engine failure. Then Jon Carlson asked:

"how often do crashes actually occur in the precise moment of rotation?"

And thus the King Air defect of crashing right after rotation came up since they do this a lot, way more than it being random.

Mike C.

^^^THIS^^^

Double digit runway excursions in the last several years in Hondajets, many with pro pilots. Very few in Citations with many more airframes in the same time period. Is it the plane or the pilot? Honda, and many that fly the plane say its pilot error, which of course it is. Some planes are just less forgiving of human pilots. I will take the plane that won’t kill me when I am having an average day. In spite of all my hubris, sometimes I am just average.

Because clearly being pro makes you safer

As Mike said, it's about preventing repeats, not appealing to your "pro-ness" or blaming pilots more generally for their attributes.

I don't think anyone is saying the problem shouldn't be corrected, I certainly am not.

I'm just saying that other than autothrottles, I have no other options to suggest.

That leaves getting the word out.

MU2s crashed due to tired pilots doing all sorts of stupid stuff when they were flying checks overnight. In one period of time, 10 of 11 crashes were 135 overnight cargo runs, single pilot, between the hours of 10pm and 7 am.

As soon as that usage stopped, the crash rate dropped significantly.

The crashes did not occur in one very specific phase of flight like the King Airs, and not from one specific defect. If the MU2 had one such specific defect, it would have been addressed.

Your attempt at deflection missed.

Mike C.

The "look over there at something worse" defense is lame.

This problem is a relatively simple mechanical fix. Reduce the spring at the engine, or add a balance spring at the throttle, or add minimum friction the pilot can't remove. Any of those changes would solve this problem. It isn't hard.

One gets the sense Textron doesn't want to solve the problem for legal reasons since it would be evidence the design is faulty. This short term thinking is long term killing people.

Mike C.

Because clearly being pro makes you safer

As Mike said, it's about preventing repeats, not appealing to your "pro-ness" or blaming pilots more generally for their attributes.