That was me, David. 100% when less than Vne and over 1k feet, although their have been saves outside of this parameter, as well.

Here's the one you are thinking of (I think):

CAPS event #5, Feb 2005, Norden, CA (not CAPS Save, parachute separated from airframe)

1 fatality; Factors: severe icing at 16,000' over Sierra mountains, high speed descent well above Vne of 204 knots; Activation: uncertain if intentional activation or due to airframe stress in high speed descent, located along track to crash site; Weather: IMC, icing; Landing: high speed impact in mountainous area.

In other words he brought a knife to a gun fight?

You know, it's funny. Here, we are debating how great the parachute is. On COPA, there are a lot of discussions on how to prevent being in the position where it's needed.

Here is a great quote from a doc over there:

"Somehow, we have to sit in the dead pilot's seat, admit that we MIGHT be able to get there, and figure out a strategy for avoiding that fate."''

While the willingness to pull has certainly improved the stats, even more is this attitude.

It depends on how you look at things.

History as kept by COPA:

https://www.cirruspilots.org/copa/safet ... story.aspx

They have a tendency whenever there was a fatality with a CAPS event to exclude that one from consideration for various reasons. The CAPS events where 1 or more occupants died:

#5: Activation too late.

#9: Activation too late.

#18: Activation too late.

#22: Activation triggered by midair.

#31: Activation too late.

#34: Activation too late.

#47: Activation too late.

#49: Activation too late.

There is a tendency to define any CAPS activation that caused a fatality as being "too late". You can always find some time earlier when it would have been "not too late". So any CAPS that causes a fatality is, by definition, too late. So the reasoning is circular and keeps the results perfect.


Improvement is good.


Why do you think pilots getting into more fatal situations is beneficial?

What about using Borman's credo, using superior judgment to avoid needing the chute in the first place? Why are Corvalis pilots like that and Cirrus pilots aren't?


Because the negatives are more significant fleet wide. You can disregard them if you wish, but an overall view shows that the Cirrus safety record has not distinguished itself for the better overall.


There have been two:

#11: Parachute trajectory anomalous, landed off airport.

#44: Chute failed to deploy, pilot flew to airport and landed normally trailing chute canister.


No, that was #5.


Yes, it is. It means that the chute didn't save his life, in fact it made it more in peril. Then he flew the airplane to a landing. Demonstrates absolutely that every CAPS pull is not necessarily a "save".


#22 fits your description, high and within envelope. All aboard died.

You need to further refine your statement to keep it true.


If so, due to the pilot, not the chute since it was one of the worst before and the chute isn't what changed.

Mike C.

Cirrus won't be the first plane maker to overpromise realistic runway performance, so I'd withhold judgment that the SF50 can operate safely in 2350 ft.

I know it CAN'T operate in 2,350 ft if the runway is covered in water, ice, or snow.

I'd rather be in the Aerostar than the SF50 if one engine quits. The SF50 has ONE TON of fuel onboard and you are about to perform an off airport landing. Good luck!

Mike C.

It depends on how you look at things.

History as kept by COPA:

https://www.cirruspilots.org/copa/safet ... story.aspx

They have a tendency whenever there was a fatality with a CAPS event to exclude that one from consideration for various reasons. The CAPS events where 1 or more occupants died:

#5: Activation too late.

#9: Activation too late.

#18: Activation too late.

#22: Activation triggered by midair.

#31: Activation too late.

#34: Activation too late.

#47: Activation too late.

#49: Activation too late.

There is a tendency to define any CAPS activation that caused a fatality as being "too late". You can always find some time earlier when it would have been "not too late". So any CAPS that causes a fatality is, by definition, too late. So the reasoning is circular and keeps the results perfect.


Improvement is good.


Why do you think pilots getting into more fatal situations is beneficial?

What about using Borman's credo, using superior judgment to avoid needing the chute in the first place? Why are Corvalis pilots like that and Cirrus pilots aren't?


Because the negatives are more significant fleet wide. You can disregard them if you wish, but an overall view shows that the Cirrus safety record has not distinguished itself for the better overall.


There have been two:

#11: Parachute trajectory anomalous, landed off airport.

#44: Chute failed to deploy, pilot flew to airport and landed normally trailing chute canister.


No, that was #5.


Yes, it is. It means that the chute didn't save his life, in fact it made it more in peril. Then he flew the airplane to a landing. Demonstrates absolutely that every CAPS pull is not necessarily a "save".


#22 fits your description, high and within envelope. All aboard died.

You need to further refine your statement to keep it true.


If so, due to the pilot, not the chute since it was one of the worst before and the chute isn't what changed.

Mike C.

Hey Mike, can you post a picture of yourself and/or your airplane? It'd be nice to put a face with the name.

The answer to car accidents is other bad drivers. You can be the best driver in the world and still be killed by some jerk.

In aviation, not generally so. The danger around you is self made almost exclusively. The trick is to realize when you are doing something dangerous and STOP DOING IT. The chute tends to delay that recognition.

Mike C.

So what you're saying is you need to be able to see yourself from an outside perspective?

You need to recognize when you are off the rails, and check yoself befo you wreck yoself?

You need to imagine what a level headed outsider would think of your action, and correct based on that perspective.

Its all so clear to me now.

Not a Solitaire, my plane is actually a bit faster. The 4 blade props on the later models is not as efficient it turns out as the 3 blade props on the earlier airplanes.

Strictly in terms of range, it takes a bout a 100 knot headwind to make going lower worthwhile. But at about 50 knots headwind, I will start to consider flying at, say, FL210/220 and going in fast mode (310 knots, 85 GPH) rather than economy mode (FL270/280, 290 knots, 65 GPH). My range is still reduced, but the penalty for going faster is reduced. Sometimes there is a big difference in the wind direction or speed between FL210 and FL270, so that factors into the computation.


I burn more than a piston airplane all around. They have the advantage of being able to go low and not have their fuel burn jump markedly.

On a 100 knot headwind day, I fly at FL210/220 and make 210 knots over the ground. On a zero wind day, FL270/280 and make 290 knots. On a 200 knot headwind day, I stay home. :-)

Mike C.

Basically, you just said the chute is not a safety device, it improves utility. You can now use the airplane in more ways than you could before because you have mentally spent the risk credit of the chute to expand your operational envelope.

This is entirely consistent with how people use airplanes of ever increasing capability. They fly to some accepted risk tolerance. If the airplane can do something more safely than another, then it can be flown on more dangerous missions than the other until the danger is back to where it was.

Indeed, if you look at the fatal accident rate of single piston, multi piston, and turboprops, it is all about 1 or so per 100K hours. That's not because a King Air is just as dangerous as a 172, it is because the King Air is asked to do more dangerous jobs than a 172.

The only problem was that pilots took TOO MUCH CREDIT for the chute. So they were actually flying PAST their risk tolerance and not realizing it. Thus a bad fatal accident rate.

If the improved safety record recently is due to more chute pulls, then pilots DIDN'T reduce the risk of their flights, they made the chute risk credit HIGHER by applying it more frequently. In my mind, the preferred way to balance the equation would be to reduce the risk credit of the chute, not to increase reasons to use it.

Mike C.

Hey, I got in the mud to wrestle. I'm out.

Edited for civility.

Agree or disagree, Mike C. is the real deal.
http://www.ciholas.com/team/mciholas

Yup.

He brought a non FIKI piston single to a FIKI twin turboprop fight. He lost.

How did he get in the position he needed the chute?

This accident started in the pilot lounge before departure.

Mike C.