Here's reality:
IF a pilot of any airliner gets himself into a position where he's not SURE what the position of his throttles are, and/or if he absolutely has legitimate control of them, the problem is with the plane; with it's design.

Folks, frankly; we DO have the ability to over engineer & over software too many things today, the cellphone in most people's pockets are a clear example of this. The typical cellphone has about a jillion apps & so on on it, and many (including me) have issues with just using it.

That being said; there should never ever ever be any ambiguity on what a throttle will do, or who is truly in control of the plane; the pilot or the AP. Same goes for cars, IMO.

Hi Chris,

I think you and I are on the same page that these accidents were very different in many ways. There's just one thing I can't help but correct:

That was definitely not the case. Both planes were on the ground prior to take-off, and both planes were where they were supposed to be, until the moment the KLM crew began their take-off roll without take-off clearance.

I know, it's of no relevance to the Airbus-vs-Boeing discussion (which, in turn, is really not of much relevance to begin with, if you ask me), but if we bring some landmark accidents into the mix, let's be as accurate as we can. Because that part of the conversation is not a matter of opinion or a trade, it's mere facts.



Best regards,
Martin

OK Mr. Moore,

Your aviatar shows you're an instructor,....great.

I also was a maintenance instructor to perform recurrent training.
We had an opportunity to make a video to try and save the airline $ by avoiding sending all the run-up and taxi mtce people to a simulator.
We asked a Captain pilot friend of ours to give us some numbers, so we could fly the sim after our video session.
This Captain knew every attitude the ADI should be at every flap setting on the B737-200, to the 1/4 degree!
He said that if we punch in a weight of around 90,000 lbs (I think, it's been awhile) and use 69% (my favoritis number) N1 it should work well, and did it ever!
Us private pilot 200 hr maintenance guys were nailing the landings.
This Captain told us that not many pilots use these attitude numbers for flap positions etc.

Is that true Mr. Moore? Don't you think the pilots should know exactly how the aircraft it going to react at different weights and temperatures and flap settings?

I hope that they all do!

AF 447 is an example you brought up.

Don't you think that one of those two relief pilots should know the airplane, especially like the Captain I spoke with?

Their engines were at max, put the aircraft in an attitude to recover from a high altitude stall, period.
On nights I used to check the Boeings and Airbus 320's. On the Airbus we'd push the priority button to check the authority.....simple "Priority Left".

What about AeroPeru with the taped over static ports, and unfortunately a night a dark as the inside of a cow! Those poor fellows porpoised up and down until finally they hit the ocean.
In hindsights, a certain N1 at a certain weight will do what?

It's just positive flying.

We all should do it.

Murray

I fully agree with you on that point, Chris. I believe we reached the point a while ago where avionics systems of an airliner, any modern airliner really, are over-engineered. Between the FMS, the autopilot/mode control panels, and fly-by-wire systems, every airliner in production today offers some solutions that seem to be in search of a problem. There are, in my opinion, often too many ways to accomplish one thing, and too many well-meant protective features that have gotten so darn complicated that it is very hard to understand them. And as you correctly pointed out, this is not just limited to airplanes. It's the world we live in.

- Martin

I stand fully & correctly corrected, thanks Martin!

And yes, Sir, we are on the same page.

The real point is (to me) that there MUST be a legitimate intrinsic & absolutely crystal clear connection between the pilot of an airliner & all of the controls at all times. The idea that "well, the pilot didn't understand the FMS or autothrottle" is unacceptable, and to me; if an educated person such as an airline pilot can't wrap his head SOLIDLY around precisely what is happening in his cockpit, than either he shouldn't be there at all, or more likely the plane should be made simpler to understand & operate.

^^^^^^^This


Murray

Murray, not sure what you want me to say.

We all know the long list of "Stupid Pilot Tricks" and hopefully learn something from them. It's too bad we don't have an all encompassing list of "Smart Pilot Tricks", because there a whole lot more of them, ie Sully on the Hudson, UAL DC-10 SUX, CAL DC-10 EWR, etc, but they don't get the sensationalist publicity.

Since the B757 first flew in 198?, there have only been 3 fatal accidents, and all were pilot/CRM issues and that Murray is what a well designed airliner looks like.

Actually just want you to say....YES we’ve learn from a lot of accidences and now incorporate “positive flying” and CRM, so the crews today are well prepared.



Murray

All of the above is correct but has nothing to do with the autothrust system or any differences between Airbus and Boeing design philosophy.

There was a problem with the approach idle and this would have been a problem with a Boeing airplane as well.



Not correct. Pushing the thrust levers up to TOGA does exactly the same thing in an Airbus as a Boeing.




Correct but this is a non issue. Boeing airliners have suffered auto-throttle malfunctions where an engine and associated thrust lever have rolled back and the crew did not notice until the aircraft slowed and the autopilot disconnected. A moving thrust lever is not the cure-all you think it is.



No, the pilot only needs to know if autothrust is engaged or disengaged. If he/she pushes them all the way up he knows they are in MAN TOGA.



No, the only difference is that the Boeing back drives the yokes and thrust levers. The controls are not bypassed. Back driven controls had no impact on this accident.




There is still plenty of mode ambiguity in a Boeing. It manifests itself in different ways but it still occurs.

Moving thrust levers did nothing to alleviate the mode confusion resulting in the crash of Asiana 214.



There are differences. You are saying one is superior to the other and you have not made a case for this assertion.

Your assumption that Airbus favors automation over Boeing is false. There are things on an Airbus that must be done manually, because Airbus wanted the pilot in the loop, that the Boeing does automatically.

Airbus has chosen to design the interface differently.



He didn't get what he wanted but it was not due to mode confusion. He did not get what he wanted because there was a design flaw that was subsequently corrected.

for all the grief people give the Russians - when i was getting my first Antonov type they drilled into us over and over, if you are ever unsure of what is happening or have conflicting flight data then use the backup instruments to set ~80% thrust, wings level, 5 deg nose up. Then do nothing for a short time and see if the data starts to make sense. The airplane will fly itself out of 99% of situations in that configuration. Works equally well whether the data problem is electrons or neurons. That emphasis on pre-programmed, simple configurations has stuck with me and there have been a few times I've defaulted to something similar in a cessna or beechcraft.

That was excellent info, Jeff.

I thought the whole argument here was that the superiority of the Boeing was it's lack of susceptibility to mode confusion?

The only three 757 crashes I am familiar with are the Cali crash, the Peru crash and the Birgenair crash.

In the Cali accident, had the aircraft been equipped with Airbus systems it would not have crashed.

If memory serves the aircraft impacted terrain less than 200ft from the summit of the mountain. The pilots attempted a max performance climb but they never stowed the speedbrakes even though the handle was in the deploy position, right in front of them, which according to the denizens here, is the only safe way to design.

Had the pilots been in an Airbus the speedbrakes would have stowed automatically and they probably would have gained at least an additional 200ft.

The Peru and the Birgenair crash were the result of blocked static and pitot ports respectively.

Types of accidents that according to you only the Airbus is susceptible.

It should also be noted that Boeing only built 1050 757s while Airbus has, thus far, built more than 7800 320 series. A large percentage of the 757s still in service are low utilization freighters. Airplanes that don't fly as much also don't crash as much.

Jon, how many Boeings flew into the ground at the end of the runway because the pilot was confused about how his airplane worked?
Exactly. None.

The Cali crash was the result of an incorrect ADF being made the active waypoint while in LNAV and the FMC turned the aircraft into a mountain. Simplified, but accurate, so is it your position that the Airbus FMC would have modified the route to avoid the obstruction?

Nah, I didn't think so

As to thrust levers, in the primary mode, the engines thrust is only limited by maximum N1 and maximum rated thrust! There is NO other computer interface that thrust selection goes through when the thrust levers are pushed full forward. When in VNAV with autothrottles engaged, the autothrottle system can be overridden by pushing the thrust levers full fwd.

Airbus proponents keep trying to dance between the raindrops, but the undeniable reality is that Boeing allows pilot much more control over the aircraft and it's systems.

I understand pilots like being able to eat their crew meal without a yoke in the way, but in my mind that's a awful big price for unfettered access to your mashed potatoes.

Airplane designs should protect us from "stupid pilot tricks"

Over and out

No, my point is that when the GPWS alerted and the pilots attempted an escape climb the speedbrakes would have stowed, the airplane would have cleared the summit and everyone would have lived.




The airbus thrust levers work exactly the same way. They can be pushed forward at anytime and will deliver maximum rated thrust with the same N1/EPR limitations.

Absolutely no difference.



This has not been demonstrated other than you beating your chest and insisting it is so.



A silly, borderline stupid comment about the reasons for incorporating a sidestick.



Isn't that what Airbus envelope protection is all about?