That's pretty damn funny. Because I'm type rated in four different models of Boeing airliners and on every single one of them, the N1 gauge is primary for power setting.

The levers are controls.

Not indicators.

But don't let that stop you, I'm really enjoying your argument above with a current and qualified A320 Captain about how his jet operates. (Actually more than one A320 pilot.)

The levers indicate the control input from BOTH the pilot and the auto throttle.

I am not disagreeing with the A320 pilots about HOW it operates, they confirmed that, I am disagreeing that it operates the SAME as a Boeing. It does NOT. There is a material difference which was exemplified by the accident pilot feeling the need to cycle the power levers through their travel range feeling he wasn't getting the power he commanded.

Mike C.

I believe this is not entirely true.
Mike C.

Again, for all of you "Airbus is just as good as Boeing" people....I have never seen a Boeing get flown into trees & kill people because the plane was doing one thing while the pilot thought it would do something else.

As I stated earlier once forward of the FLEX/MCT detent the autothrust system is disengaged and thrust is in manual. ALWAYS. Unless this pilot sudden completely forgot how airplanes work I don't see how he was confused.



There is no automatic mode to cancel forward of the MCT detent. There are only two thrust settings possible past that detent; the thrust corresponding to Thrust Lever Angle and TOGA activated by Alpha Floor.



There isn't a turbojet out there that uses TLA to indicate delivered thrust to the pilot.

Again, we are talking about a manual thrust mode in the accident airplane.



This would be true for a Boeing FADEC system as well so what is your point?



As I stated before this has nothing to do with the autothrust system. All FADEC and most older generation turbofans with at least a basic fuel computer have several idle settings. Some have as many as three; ground idle, flight idle, approach idle.

It takes a l o n g time to spool an engine up from flight idle. (It was largely for this reason that the stabalized approach concept was borne)

Not withstanding the stupidity of a flyby with passengers there was a problem with the approach idle on the accident airplane that resulted in a change. This, however, has nothing to do with the airbus autothrust system. This would have been a problem on any FADEC controlled jet.



It only shows that the airplane was not responding as he thought it was. There was a problem but it was unrelated to the autothrust system. It was a problem with the approach idle setting combined with a stupid pilot trick.



Not when the trust levers are at TOGA.

Had the accident aircraft been equipped with Boeing autothrottles there would have been no difference because they were in a manual thrust mode.



Again, no they don't. The Boeing levers show commanded thrust, not actual thrust. There is a difference and it's an important one.



Correct, but the Airbus was not in an autothrust mode, it was in a manual mode and worked identically to Boeing in the accident phase.



The semantics of the lever controls? You are deep in left field.

They work EXACTLY the same when in manual. Same indirect pilot to engine interface, same TLA to commanded thrust relationship.

The only difference is when the autothrust system is active.



Only true on the Boeing for coordinated flight path changes. The pilot will not see the yoke(s) move when the FBW system moves the flight controls for load and gust alleviation.

It was clear the pilot was not getting what he expected. His statements after the crash and his actions prior to it indicate that clearly. If the engines were responding as he expected, there is NO REASON he would have cycled the levers. At the very least, this indicates the man machine interface wasn't working. The pilot was not getting what HE expected.


The Boeing levers have no "mode". That's my point you seem completely unable to comprehend. The levers are the engine command at all times in all modes. This is simply not true for Airbus.


Granted, but the Airbus levers don't ALWAYS show commanded thrust.


Correct, but the pilot has to know which mode the levers are in to know if they show the command.

The basic issue is that the Airbus auto pilot/thrust computers BYPASS the cockpit controls, where in a Boeing, the auto pilot/thrust computers go through the cockpit controls.

This is a fundamental change in the man machine interface.


In a Boeing, they work exactly the same ALL THE TIME. There is no mode ambiguity, no need to qualify "when in manual mode".

There is no disagreement between us on HOW the systems work and differ, there appears to be disagreement in whether those differences are SIGNIFICANT. I say they are.

The accident pilot did not get what he was expecting. Airbus did make some change to the control system after the accident.

Mike C.

As I’ve said in a previous post, I love most airplanes including Boeings!

But the KLM 747 at Tenerife was flown into the other 747 for much the same reason as the 320 that hit the trees. Pilot arrogance coupled with copilot timidness.
The Airbus pilot lived and was covering his arrogant butt by saying it wasn’t doing what he wanted, including showing pictures of the elevators doing opposite HIS commands.
How dare the airplane do that to him, the senior pilot of Air France!

Murray

Murray, there's nothing similar about the Tenerife accident & the Airbus one.

Whatever.

I'm just glad to be on a commercial airliner where I'm about as safe as can be.

I do sweat the shuttle bus to the terminal whether it's a GM or Ford bus, either way.

Chris,

I respectfully disagree. I have studied both of these accidents in a lot of detail, and in his post Murray put his finger on what I very clearly see as a common element in both accidents: pilot arrogance and copilot timidness. I couldn't have found better words for it.

As different as these accidents were in terms of aircraft involved, loss of lives, etc. - either accident could have easily been prevented by removing that common element from the chain of events.

- Martin

As I’ve said in a previous post, I love most airplanes including Boeings!

But the KLM 747 at Tenerife was flown into the other 747 for much the same reason as the 320 that hit the trees. Pilot arrogance coupled with copilot timidness.
The Airbus pilot lived and was covering his arrogant butt by saying it wasn’t doing what he wanted, including showing pictures of the elevators doing opposite HIS commands.
How dare the airplane do that to him, the senior pilot of Air France!

Murray

Maybe a Delta guy could come on here and talk about the new A350 and the philosophy change at EADS, emphasis on pilot control and airman ship, that now mirrors Boeing. From the magazine articles I have read it seems like a total sea change. But I am just a trained engineer, so maybe a professional could weigh in.

Airbus has found new ways to kill people. We promise to take care of you, until we can't then we will fail you spectacularly and at the worst possible moment when you expected us to have your back, because that's what we promised. And not only that, but we will automate the hell of it and dump it back in your lap once we have attempted to totally rid you of any skill you might have had.

See Mike C.'s post on the AOA failure on the acceptance flight with the check airmen and chief pilot on board. That was a trim stall if I remember correctly.

Martin-

I agree with you Martin, respectfully, that the problems were pilot arrogance etc in both of the accidents. That being said, the accidents were definitively different in a thousand ways....in Tenerife, one plane was LANDING & hit another plane that was on the runway; on the airbus accident the pilot was trying to climb out when his aircraft didn't respond. Now granted, maybe the airbus didn't respond because the pilot input a command incorrectly; but the fact is; the Tenerife accident happened because another plane wasn't supposed to BE on the runway, and the airbus happened because the pilot didn't have control over what his aircraft was doing, or going to do. He was factually NOT in control of his aircraft, and the primary reason for this was both his own incompetency & control systems that are not fail or fool proof.

There's a little more to it than that. In fact, I think most 'sky gods' would have screwed that one up too, faced with the same info. Yes, they messed up bad, but it was confusing scenario in a high stress situation. Now if just AOA had been displayed properly, and not as a buried data in airliners, then...

https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash