How about this for a start Donald.
He said:

So there is an A-10 driver talking about the A-10 not "terribly well suited" for a high threat type scenario. Then goes on to talk about how another 250 its would be welcomed and you want to argue with him. What experience do you have, other than an Army grunt perspective, to tell him that he is wrong in his assessment. At least if it were another A-10 pilot - or any strike pilot - wanting to mince words that person would have some like perspective.

I'm sure he knows the history of the airplane. You don't need to tell him that.
YOU know how well the A-10 is suited for the high threat CAS environment better than the A-10 pilot? YOU need to tell the A-10 pilot about redundancy in aircraft's systems?
Please.


Ah....that is actually kind of sad

I would have hoped that Sen McCain, or his staffers, would have been up to date on their reading of the Joint CAS publication. Seems they aren't aware of the different types of CAS and think of only traditional Type 1 CAS too. On top of that - no where has anyone on this board said anything about B-1s REPLACING A-10s in the CAS role; and they have conducted CAS per the definitions of the JP 3-09.3.

Quotes:
1) There are three types of control (Types 1, 2, and 3).
2) The tactical situation will define the risk associated with a given type of TAC (e.g., GPS and digital targeting systems used in Type 2 control may be a better mitigation of risk than using Type 1).
3) Various ground elements or aircrews conducting a wide variety of missions can search for, identify, and provide the location of targets using systems like Global Positioning System (GPS), laser designators/range finders, and aircraft targeting pods.

Until you understand the updated view of CAS on the modern battlefield, you arguments are the essence of straw man alert.


Exactly where is "forward" with our troops? An 8,000' strip of highway without the support required for operations? I'm not a believer in the FOB concept since I watched our Harriers sit at Ali Al Salem after taking numerous airfields in southern Iraq at the start of OIF. Maybe they had enough work in Basra to keep them busy, but I doubt it.


ALL aircraft are vulnerable to the right hit. Some go down, some fly back.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q ... 1115760252

https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q ... 1115760252


Yep - no kidding. You are really trying to compare and contrast TTPs for the Germans and WWII and todays combat environment?
You are losing credibility quickly Donald.
I suppose you would lead combat troops in a frontal assault on machine gun positions uphill against fortified positions too? War is political remember Donald? You know darn well what POWs do to a war effort and what shaky legs the American public has for casualties.


No you really don't. It has become sadly evident.
You are advocating hanging around in a high threat environment? If in a low threat environment - I've held in a target area just fine in my 'fast mover'.


OK....not disputed.


I'd rather make him have the Senate Armed Services Committee read the current operational publications it seems.

@ Dave: You are correct. Every airframe has a role in CAS in today's environment. Sometimes RW CAS will provide better coverage, some FW CAS will. Sometimes targeting will be by people on the ground, sometimes though coordinates to a JDAM, or targeting PODs after 'talk-on' Type 3 CAS.


We all hope for this - and not only in the military! We'd often like them to have CURRENT and RELEVANT experience too. What percentage is it now that our politicians (and their aides for goodness sakes) have ANY military experience?

When I attended the Infantry Officers Course at Ft. Beginning in ‘74. We spent a lot of time in tactics on delaying the Russian Hordes coming through the Fulda Gap. Pretty overwhelming to think of an infantry unit holding up armor columns. One of the most difficult ground maneuvers to perform: requires a LOT of unit training to be done well. Thoughts of Korea when the North came running down with T-34s and lots of Russian artillery.
I was also an aviator. We had some TOW missiles on Cobras; Hell Fire was talk. The strategy was to mask behind a hill or tree line; pop up; shoot and re-mask. Problem with the TOW was one had to keep target in sight and guide it in before hiding again. Not long life expectancy stuff.
Then, I would go home to a wife who was overwhelmed after being alone with our young daughter all day and wanted to talk about her day. I wasn’t the best listener.
Hat’s off to our young service folks doing that today.

Brian: I don’t know how we do it. We seem to enter every war somewhat ill prepared. The ones thrust upon us quickly were worse, of course. Once we get going, we seem to catch up and kick butt, but early on can be pretty bad.
I look back on my time as somewhat Forrest Gumpish. All this stuff was going on that I didn’t fully understand, but I did what I could and somehow muddled my way through it.

Thanks for referring to the joint CAS report. Worth a read!

https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_09_3.pdf

I've got that joint report downloaded and look froward to reading when I finish something I'm well into now.
Upon reflection, the shoulder-fired missile sure changed a lot. Sure affected the days of the low, slow air support aircraft. AF and Army took different approaches to mitigating. I look forward to reading though.

It’s not really a report, it’s a regulation that prescribes the procedures we will use in conducting CAS. It’s a joint publication, so it has been agreed to by all the services. It gets periodically updated as we get new equipment or discover better ways to do things.

As a former grunt, I’ll look through the illustrations first :-)

Good plan. Like most top-level pubs, there are sections that will cure even the most severe cases of insomnia.

"Donald, you have pieced together a web of misinformation, half truths, and outright falsehoods to support a rather ludicrous position on The A10. You compound it with mind numbing verbosity."

...that's a remarkable statement...and pretty thin...not to mention basically a cheap shot

...of course, please feel free to discuss any specifics regarding my alleged "misinformation, half truths, and outright falsehoods"

...and what exactly is my "rather ludicrous position on the A-10" ?

...the only "ludicrous" position on the HOG was from the AF when they attempted to dump it prematurely and the Senate and the House said NO....so, are you saying their position was "ludicrous" as well? That the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman had a "ludicrous" position on the HOG...give me a break...

...I'm curious, really ...the only thing I've heard from this HOG driver is that basically he would like more break away speed after a CAS run, and that gee, we might take a lot of casualties in this mission

...actually, Sprey and crew recognized that the HOG could use more speed and power to pull out after a run to avoid enemy small arms/AD fire...but it's a trade off when you look at speed versus maneuverability at low levels...but in any event, Sprey had some ideas on how to improve HOG "II"--but the AF had No interest on developing a second generation CAS aircraft....Fact


"If you want to learn anything about CAS, or the A10, find a guy who flew the Hog, then went to another airframe".


...that's even a more remarkable statement, but pretty telling...

...I've been looking at a couple of Military History Masters Programs available online to keep me occupied during my third life when it comes up down the road...Norwich has a very good one that is well established and now the WWII Museum just started one in concert with ASU which is concentrated completely on WWII

...been thinking about what my thesis would be...and I think I might look to research on how the AF has neglected the CAS mission...after all we have decades of experience in this to research...

...but the above quote, no less from the "horses mouth" no doubt, I believe will be the basis of my thesis...meaning that much has been written already on the AF's historical neglect of the CAS mission, and more recently their disgraceful tactics to dump the HOG prematurely...

...but as reflected in the quote above from a HOG driver, the real issue is that the typical AF pilot is simply not cut out, nor interested, to perform CAS...as noted in Exhibit A above here is an example of an AF pilot that bailed out of the A-10--which despite its shortcomings that are expectedly to be present with any first generation aircraft--is the finest CAS aircraft ever built...indeed, it is the only aircraft designed specifically for the CAS role...

...and thinking out loud, wonder what aircraft he went to? and would that aircraft perform the CAS mission as well as the HOG?

...so the basis of my thesis will be that the CAS role is too important to be left up to the typical AF pilot...they either don't care, or don't have the make up to perform it...of course there are notable exceptions, but rare...

...now to be clear...the typical AF pilots are undoubtedly great Americans, exceptional aviators, and no doubt would demonstrate great courage in any future conflict against the bad-guy fighter in air to air battles...but, having said that, the CAS mission is a different deal...takes an Army Infantry or Armor Officer mentality to pull it off...no doubt one of the most difficult missions on the battlefield

...let's face it, the typical AF pilot is not one that our troops on the ground in the fight should have to count on to perform CAS...no doubt the AF pilots are good guys and gals and all that...great Americans...but not suited for the mission...Fact...

...indeed, not many Army Officers suited for the role either...takes an Infantry or Armor mentality

…solution? AF needs to give up the CAS mission....let the Army handle it...they just don't care...pretty much the same way the AF has neglected our Interballistic Missile System program, but that's another story...

Ok Brian, let me go and retrieve some Cognac then....

So there is an A-10 driver talking about the A-10 not "terribly well suited" for a high threat type scenario. Then goes on to talk about how another 250 its would be welcomed and you want to argue with him. What experience do you have, other than an Army grunt perspective, to tell him that he is wrong in his assessment. At least if it were another A-10 pilot - or any strike pilot - wanting to mince words that person would have some like perspective.

...no, this is an A-10 driver stating the obvious--that if the WP would have attacked back in the day in a Fulda Gap scenario they would have taken a lot of casualties...no kidding...doesn't mean that it wasn't suited for the mission

...whose arguing about wanting another 250? ...Sprey knew their were limitations on the HOG and had designs on how to improve it, but the AF shut him down

...the Bradley Fighting Vehicle was poorly designed in that It had too high a silhouette...doesn't mean that resulted with our Infantry Officers branch transferring out of the Infantry...no, they stayed on and worked to develop tactics the best they could and provided input on how to develop a better fighting vehicle


...you fly guys do make me smile when you talk about "risk" and the new buzz words as "near peer" adversaries and so on....but, my friend do you have any idea what the expected casualty rates would have been for our troopers in the 11ACR had the balloon went up? yet, I don't recall any of those outstanding Armor Officers sitting around the O'Club lamenting about their plight and equipment...

"I'm sure he knows the history of the airplane. You don't need to tell him that."


...more hyperbole my friend...where is his history of the Hog accurate versus mine?

...I'm waiting for specifics...and more than they wanted "250 more"

"Various ground elements or aircrews conducting a wide variety of missions can search for, identify, and provide the location of targets using systems like Global Positioning System (GPS), laser designators/range finders, and aircraft targeting pods."


….sure, there might always be scenarios where GPS and laser designators might do the job...but that's kind of like a side bar...but let's got back to basics...

...what do the JTACs say about the aircraft they want on station when they are in the fight with their Infantry and the bad guys are danger close in the ditch across from their ditch...JTACs all say "give me the HOG"...

...btw, what ever happened to the JTACs speaking out on behalf of the HOG...I'll tell you--AF brass threatened them with "treason" and so on...never hear from the JTACs any more

"Until you understand the updated view of CAS on the modern battlefield, you arguments are the essence of straw man alert."

...Ivory tower alert...you ask the Soldier, Marine, or JTAC on the ground and they will tell you there is nothing "modern" about the battlefield...the bad guy in the ditch across from their ditch is trying to kill them...and they don't want CAS from a supersonic nuclear capable strategic bomber for CAS as they are in a firefight in the dirt against the bad guys...and we are typically faced with having to fight in the bad guy's back yard where they know the terrain...our guys deserve the best CAS, not CAS designed from the "ivory Tower"

...AF is re writing doctrine and deploying fast movers and B-1 Bombers to perform a mission they are poor suited for...

...you keep quoting current "doctrine" as if it was the Bible...it's not..."doctrine" is ever evolving....and often, it "evolves" back to the basics

….solution, esp for the most recent fights...deploy enough A-10 squadrons to Theater and we will be fine...

"Exactly where is "forward" with our troops? An 8,000' strip of highway without the support required for operations? I'm not a believer in the FOB concept since I watched our Harriers sit at Ali Al Salem after taking numerous airfields in southern Iraq at the start of OIF. Maybe they had enough work in Basra to keep them busy, but I doubt it."

…"forward" my friend, is far enough forward where our troops don't have to wait too long for the A-10s to arrive as you implied in earlier posts...A-10s were designed to operate well forward with our troops...Harrier was not...what does the Harrier have to do with any of this?

...how far forward? ...I'd deploy them right up with our ground maneuver units...and, the support goes with them....

ALL aircraft are vulnerable to the right hit. Some go down, some fly back.


...another remarkable statement...yes, all aircraft are "vulnerable" to the right hit...but, alas, some are more "vulnerable" than others

...but let's get down to brass tacks...you don't really believe the AF will risk the F35 flying CAS missions down in the dirt? heck, any grunt knows damn well they will Never see the F35 down in the weeds with them

"War is political remember Donald? You know darn well what POWs do to a war effort and what shaky legs the American public has for casualties. "

...that's another remarkable statement...it's hard to keep up...America will endure casualties if the mission is just....and they damn well know that we are going to lose a lot of good Armor and Infantry Officers against a worth adversary...why should the AF pilots be immune from the same risks ? ...and spare me how much it takes to train them..like I said, give the CAS mission to the Army...we will coach up the CAS pilots

...give the mission to the Army and there will be a mile long line of Army volunteers to fulfill the mission

AND THE HITS KEEP ON COMING....

"No you really don't. It has become sadly evident.
You are advocating hanging around in a high threat environment?"

No, I'm not advocating "hanging around" in a high threat environment...I'm advocating Fighting in a high threat environment...

_________

and Brian, having said all that...I'm curious then...what's Your view on POGO's analysis then as discussed in a related thread and posted below???

...POGO says what I and many Infantry Officers believe...that the bad guys air defense against our CAS aircraft would not be nearly effective as the AF claims because if we are shooting back at them they are going to have to duck...that basically if the AF works as part of a combined arms concept CAS can be conducted in a high intensity conflict


https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2018 ... off-farce/

We seem to be talking around one of the central arguments in this thread but not directly addressing it. The very characteristics that grunts love about the A-10 is that it's big, mean looking, and loud when it does the job- like having a scary looking big brother right there backing you up.

Which system works better? Something that is scary and in your face enough that they keep the bad guys' heads down (but they get shot anyway), or something that is high tech and can kill the bad guys in a way that they won't see or hear it coming- and a way that they can't shoot back? It depends on who you're up against. I wouldn't count out the effect on good guy morale of the first way, but I wouldn't count out the effectiveness of the second way either.


... and now back to our regularly scheduled arguments.

...good points...and part of the central argument before Congress has been that the Hog not only gives our guys confidence when the Hog shows up, but also that the Hog intimidates the bad guys like fast movers can't

...problem with the "second way" is that JTACs will tell you that--esp. in poor weather conditions and restricted terrain--that the "technology" is not always that effective...especially when your danger close....for the vast majority of the missions the JTACs will take the HOG

...also, CAS in the traditional sense is more than just laying down ordinance on the bad guys...that the pilots in the CAS role can help the ground guys see and shape the battlefield...fast movers can't perform that traditional role

...and sorry, but "getting shot at" should be considered to be part of the deal when the AF pilots sign up...Army Officers damn sure understand that

I think all members of the military understand that. And am pretty sure you aren’t saying fast mover pilots are avoiding the dangers of combat. Should infantry and armor guys berate transportation officers because they are not combat arms? No, you normally choose your poison in the military. I was an army attack pilot for my career by choice. I knew that I’d get shot at and be close to the fight.

But I still had fellow army officers of other branches basically “bitch” that I received flight pay and flew “away”after the fight like I had no risk.

My response always almost no matter the rank. “Flight school starts every two weeks Sir”