So, my question is when we have these discussions, why not a note in the QRH that says descent below FL350 may be required if XXX, YYY malfunctions occur when operating on one pack? It’s obviously a factor, so a quick note would better prepare a crew to be looking for other associated abnormals.

It has nothing to do with the pack malfunction itself, just the lack of info with obvious contradictions.

“:peace:

The FCOM systems description clearly states that pressurisation can be maintained at all altitudes during single pack ops, (maybe the older types like the 767 have a different statement in systems description? ) If a specific tail number can’t perform as per FCOM then it’s an issue with that specific aircraft and likely requires actioning of another NNC.
I can’t ever see Boeing writing a statement after the pack inop NNC like…”Oh yeah, be careful some aircraft aren’t up to spec due to maintenance of the remaining pack, if that’s the case it might not work correctly..good luck “. They do make a statement as follows….” Review all warning lights, caution lights and other alerts, and do other NNCs as needed” . Sort of covers the scenario in my mind.

Why doesn’t the QRH require descent? Consider the risk strategy of continuation of the specific flight on a single pack vs dispatching the aircraft for up to 10 days and up to maybe 80 to 100 sectors under DDG relief. Personally, I’m happy I’m not required to descend, it gives me more options for the safe continuation of the flight considering FOD, enroute WX, maintenance etc etc. I “may” descend, but maybe I won’t….I’ll weight up the risks and threats of the specific situation.

I’m also happy to know if it’s going to be dispatched under DDG on subsequent flights it will be with restrictions and appropriate fuel and WX planning. The QRH we have does not say “continue normal Ops” for a single operative pack. That statement is reserved for a successful pack reset and dual pack ops restored…with single pack it’s “end of checklist”….over to us to do pilot stuff.. to me I would refer to the DDG for information to help in decision making.

Sorry, I’ve even away with family, I saw in an earlier post you consider an AP to be functional in a swept wing jet without operative AP stab trim? I’m not aware of any DDG item that would allow this let alone cater for the threats of a severe out of trim on AP disconnect . Once again, I don’t blame Boeing for wanting to suggest to a crew an AP is inop without trim capability. The Stab out of trim NNC would also be a result and would ultimately guide you a carry out a procedure similar to the stab trim runaway…control column grasp and hold etc..and disengage and do NOT re engage the AP..why go there to start with?

Flap assymetry QRH calls for selecting the next smaller flap setting. Personally I would do a missed approach at that flap setting, complete NNC, consider emergency services, work out my correct speed additive, calculate required field length then make an approach. Landing on a runway with unknown speed additives, unknown field length requirements and GPWS “too low flap “ shouting at me would be something I would prefer to avoid if possible .

This is just my view, nothing more. From what I’ve seen the NNC for flight control non normals have improved massively over the years, in times gone by they were not as clear as they are now. Sometimes the good old days weren’t all that great either . I think you made comment about being restricted by conducting QRH NNC procedures vs “being a pilot”. Once again my view only, but being procedural and following a published procedure that’s been designed and risk mitigated by the manufacturer is the only way to go in an aircraft with complex systems , many of which are inter linked. It’s also advantageous from a multi crew perspective and keeps the crew both on the same page.

There is zero doubt Boeing dropped the ball in recent well published events, also their teething issues for some previous types are also not exactly their finest moments, 737NG tail plane flutter with speed brakes, centre fuel pump ADs, Classic actuator trunion failing and fouling on aileron cables, rudder hard overs….the list goes on….and they all got rectified and resulted in amazingly reliable airframes.

I think it’s easy to unfairly lay blame on them for a lot of other things that are there for very good reason. If there really is an anomaly in any documents or checklists I would refer to the company tech pilot for clarification and if necessary contact Boeing to clarify or amend as suggested in the previous post.

Folowing the Airspeed Unreliable QRH actually puts crews in a worse position than if they just made their best guess and set a known pitch/power for the current phase of flight while the PM got into the QRH and related performance charts. At cruise, it's not uncommon for a crew to lose over 60kts actual airspeed sitting at 4 deg/75% N1 before the PM gets the charted pitch/power settings and the PF sets them. And, AF 447 proved that at least some crews won't run the UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED QRH without getting an AIESPEED UNRELIABLE alert, which goes back to what I said above about getting conditioned to needing an alert before consulting a QRH. They never did run the QRH or PHASE ONE procedures.

https://youtu.be/4XFq9HjyeRc

In a nutshell Boeing has no interest in designing a new airplane until 2035. WTF?

From the mid 50s to the mid 90s they made 7 that's about 1 every 6 years. From the dreamliner 2011 certification that would be 24 years between clean sheet aircraft.


https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_787_Dreamliner

When I was looking up the year the dreamliner was certified I read this in Wikipedia,

In 2003, a recent addition to the Boeing board of directors, James McNerney (who would become Boeing's Chairman and CEO in 2005), supported the need for a new aircraft to regain market share from Airbus. The directors on Boeing's board, Harry Stonecipher (Boeing's President and CEO) and John McDonnell issued an ultimatum to "develop the plane for less than 40 percent of what the 777 had cost to develop 13 years earlier, and build each plane out of the gate for less than 60 percent of the 777's unit costs in 2003", and approved a development budget estimated at US$7 billion as Boeing management claimed that they would "require subcontractors to foot the majority of costs". Boeing Commercial Airplanes president Alan Mulally, who had previously served as general manager of the 777 programs contrasted the difference in the approval process by the board between the 777 and 787 saying "In the old days, you would go to the board and ask for X amount of money, and they'd counter with Y amount of money, and then you'd settle on a number, and that's what you'd use to develop the plane. These days, you go to the board, and they say, 'Here's the budget for this airplane, and we'll be taking this piece of it off the top, and you get what's left; don't f--- up.'"[9]

They are certainly gaining market share from Airbus

In all seriousness how does a company of any industry expect to stay competitive and gain or at least maintain the market share they already have without making new products?

Imagine if Apple only sold the iPod shuffle and iPhone 4?Think about how successful they would be while saving all that money not spent on R&D.

Olive A talking to her board said something along the lines of "no we will not design a replacement for the bonanza. We will keep building bonanzas as long as people are buying them and then we will not build them anymore"

Hmmmm. 10 Billion$ in new model development cost, min 1500 units ordered to ever break even and airlines are not asking for a new model. Not to mention, 787 program is still billions in the hole, and the max set them back another 13 billion. Nothing to see here.

Management provided poor vision and direction. Upgrades to the 737 should have been a clean sheet solution 15-20 years ago. But, they rolled the dice and got snake eyes.....

Boeing doesn't build it and they will come. Airlines make the firm request and will build with enough orders. Data point the 777 finally broke even at 1500 units.

The 737NG was supposed only to be a between airplane in the classic and all-new clean sheet model. But one very larger domestic airline order wanted very little changes, such as no auto throttles, no new screen displays (yes, they actually kept the screens to look like an 6-pack) and they actually held back the model. Airline CEOs want bottom line performance. Pilots want all the bells and whistles. The NG was such a performer, some 7000 units were ordered and this was for a gap aircraft! Meanwhile you still get Cat3 auto land , RNP-AR, incredible performance and 99% dispatch reliability.

Again, if you bring in the 1500 units order, they will design, test and certify a new model.

How is that working out? That's right Cirrus left them in the dust with a better airplane.