Agreed. My point is that there are plenty of other CAS platforms out there, and CAS won't just go to the F-35. In some scenarios, other airframes are actually better for CAS than the A-10. CAS that is optimized for the A-10 isn't that big a piece of the pie anymore, and as such standing up an entire airframe for the occasional scenario that an A-10 is best at is unaffordable. I'd like to have a sportscar, a pickup truck, a suburban, and a few other specialty cars at home, but my budget doesn't support that, so I compromise. The Air Force is in the same position. I'm sure they'd like to have the A-10. Since other systems can do most of that mission, it is presently an unaffordable luxury.
Concerning abuse, F-15s land with half a wing, and 16s/18s etc are all amazingly tough. A-10 had a high loss rate in Desert Storm, and were restricted from ops in certain areas due to ADA threats. 30/40 year old ADA threats, operated by an incompetent, shattered third world military.

...interesting discussion, indeed...just some additional comments to the observations made to add to the ongoing dialogue...

"CAS isn't an airframe, it is a mission."

...sounds good enough in theory I guess-and that's the current AF mantra that I've heard from many--to include unfortunately from current AF pilots in F-35 transition...however, there are problems with that line of thought to include that back as far as the Vietnam era the AF conceded that a separate aircraft (either designed for or otherwise modified) was necessary for CAS and the existing A-7 in our Country's inventory was subsequently modified for that role...

...also, coming out of the CAS lessons learned in combat from Korea and Vietnam specifically-- the Pentagon ultimately determined that a separate air frame Was required for the CAS mission...and from that thought process the A-10 was developed...

...for the AF to now claim that CAS: "isn't an airframe" but a "mission" is somewhat disingenuous and, to be sure, a contradiction of documented history on the matter

"Unfortunately the USAF can't afford to fund the level of CAS the Army would like, and still pay for other mission"

...say's who? ...the AF? ...and what credibility do they have left on the topic? ...and, what of the relative lower costs of operating the A-10 in a CAS role as opposed to supersonic bombers? ... and since this topic of costs has been raised--what about the duplicity of missions in the AF that "F" or " B" designated aircraft are currently fulfilling for the AF?... hesitant to go down that road of scrutinizing aircraft currently in inventory because personally I love them all--but certainly convenient for the AF to play the "cost" card to divest the A-10 while ignoring the obvious redundancy in other roles...sorry, but line of thought is pretty weak--the AF must come up with something more solid in their numbers/ rationale to justify dumping the A-10 which will ultimately save lives on the battlefield...

"The A10 was a good, but not great, airplane. Read some of the Desert Storm after action reports."

...who says the A-10 was great?...yet, unfortunately, another AF Red Herring... the A-10, like any other aircraft or weapon system that experienced its first taste of combat had flaws exposed that were previously undiscovered otherwise in its developmental phase...so what?...as I understand it for example--the pilots reported that it could have had more engine power in some instances to recover from its strafing runs...fine--good PIREP...let's make the correction as we do with any weapon system and move on...in any event, the A-10 remains the best aircraft in inventory for the CAS role...

"There are always a few leaders who misbehave."

...true...but as a self proclaimed amateur military historian like others on this forum, I'd be hard pressed to think of any other examples in our Country's history where an Officer in a leadership position was relieved for threatening his subordinates with "treason" for discussing with Congress a particular weapon system's capabilities...and, of course, these events aren't occurring in a vacuum and it is clear that the AF--in Concert--has set off on an ill-advised mission to mislead Congress and the American public on the A-10 and the related CAS mission...history will document this to be so...

The A-10 isn't survivable as soon as you put enemy fighters up

...really?...says who?....are the enemy fighters not going to be engaged with our Country's fighters otherwise? ... not to mention that the enemy fighters have to contend with our Air Defense Systems...also, not sure of when the enemy fighter pilots are going to find the time after combating our own fighters and AD systems as well as concentrating on their higher priority targets to seek out and destroy an A-10 at tree top level performing CAS missions? ...another Red Herring argument...

...and, while we are on the topic of "survivability"--what, exactly, does the AF consider acceptable suvivabilty rates? ...what are acceptable loses? ...in relation to our other military branches--is the AF ultimately too Risk Averse to take on the CAS mission?

The Air Force is in the same position. I'm sure they'd like to have the A-10

...sorry, but the AF has not only fought the A-10's fielding from its inception, but has time and time again attempted to dump it prematurely...there are simply no grounds to state that the AF would "like to have the A-10"

____

...at the end of the day to support the troops on the ground in the fight it will be important: #1: that CAS Aircraft be directly assigned to and under the operational control of Army Maneuver Cdrs--Div Level (a concept that the AF has been opposed to...a concept, indeed, that our Soviet adversaries in the Cold War fully adopted and that we would have faced had they attacked in Europe...and, #2: it is imperative that a separate CAS aircraft be designated...this is not only because of the unique operational requirements of the CAS mission, but also that the aircraft isn't "tasked" away otherwise for presumably higher priorities...

I say it.

Also all my buddy's who fly A-10's say it. They simply do not operate in a high-threat air-to-air environment. They have only the most basic form of self defense and they can't run away fast enough to be part of a small/fast tactical strike package.

Yes, the rest of us will be out there trying to keep the enemy fighters busy. That doesn't mean that we can find and engage them all. If the threat is truly there, the A-10 won't be out there.

"Our air defense systems" won't be in play if we are doing CAS - Patriots don't sit on the front lines where we could lose one. If anything, we'd all be dealing with enemy air defense systems and fighters.

A-10's don't do CAS at tree-top level anymore - sure they get low but they don't stay at 100' for the entire sortie.

You are bringing arguments that really don't apply. At least not in the last 20 years.

I say it.

"also all my buddy's who fly A-10's say it. They simply do not operate in a high-threat air-to-air environment"

...interesting, to get your perspective...and, I get it--your saying current AF doctrine holds the A-10s don't operate in a high threat air to air environment...not arguing that isn't so according to current AF doctrine--but I am questioning the underlying current doctrine...just like I would question the AF's current decision making in their deployment of fast movers and supersonic bombers for CAS roles in the Current War on Terror when A-10s or Army resources otherwise could fulfill the majority of those missions...and at a far less costs to our taxpayers...

...curious also as I am bringing up arguments from "20 years" ago as you say--are you suggesting that the A-10s would have sat out the initial stages of a Third World War back in Europe had the Soviets attacked because they don't operate in a high threat air to air environment?

...and assuming that the A-10s would Not have sat out the War had the Warsaw Pact attacked--are you now suggesting that our potential adversaries capabilities have improved that much in the past 20 years that this would warrant grounding the A-10 in today's environment when we would have sent them up against the old Warsaw Pact otherwise?

...and, so, under AF current doctrine then--if in the future we are in a War and the battles have been going on for days and we are achieving only air parity at best how long exactly does the AF intend to delay providing CAS to Army units currently in the fight?

"Our air defense systems" won't be in play if we are doing CAS - Patriots don't sit on the front lines where we could lose one. If anything, we'd all be dealing with enemy air defense systems and fighters."

...while setting aside a moment where the Army may or may not deploy their Patriots, bear in mind that we have other organic air defense systems to bring to the fight against enemy air...to include small arms fire...your not suggesting that we are going to shut down "air defense systems" across the battlefield while CAS may or may not be in progress in some areas?

"A-10's don't do CAS at tree-top level anymore - sure they get low but they don't stay at 100' for the entire sortie".

...that is somewhat of a definitive statement...I'd suggest though whether they do or don't do this "anymore" would be dependent on many factors in a future conflict --notwithstanding current AF doctrine--such as the mission, terrain, threat, weather, friendly forces disposition, etc...

...by my larger point--that you didn't necessarily address--is that looking at this from our potential adversaries' perspective doesn't it appear their fighters would have their hands full with our fighters, and yes--our AD systems in one capacity or the other, and would likely have higher priorities than CAS aircraft?...not sure of the doctrinal wisdom that holds A-10s can't fly once enemy fighters are airborne....and, using that logic the Army would have to ground their choppers until the AF assures them the coast is clear...

...there is also another dynamic at play...that if the A-10 were placed under the operational control of our Division Commanders they could operate well forward--which they are well suited to do--and their close proximity to the front lines would limit the nature/duration of their sorties thereby providing another layer of force protection...

"There are a lot of airframes that can do CAS, in 99% of the instances, as well or better than the A10"

...really? 99%? ...please elaborate

Another pipe dream unfortunately - the US Army is only starting to grasp the cycle, requirements and scope that goes into a war-time ATO. Sure, the division commanders would be able to tell the A-10's where to attack and where to hold up. That works great in a no-a/a threat arena (already covered that part). The Army has absolutely no clue how to coordinate kill box deconfliction, tanker deconfliction, departure/arrival deconfliction, transitions to/from the AOR or how to work with the air war that would be (in your example) raging above (but somehow not affecting the A-10s). It just doesn't work for many of the reasons already covered.

Don, you mention deploying A10s forward, under Army control. Two issues here. One is that the Hog is a crappy short field airplane. Lands short, but doesn't takeoff that way.

The bigger issue is Army control of CAS assets. The Army does a lot of things well, but in my limited experience as an ALO, effective use of air assets isn't one of them.

The warthog is a good platform against Toyota hiluxes with AK47s, but with modern ADAs and the proliferation of good, effective manpads, hi threat CAS has evolved to require effective standoff capabilities. So back to the question, how much do we spend to maintain a low threat CAS machine whose capabilities can be effectively duplicated by other multirole platforms?

...interesting comments...

"No I'm saying that they would have launched and died. In the cold war/WW3 those loses were acceptable. We are now dealing with a CNN-fed public that is pissed about 2k deaths in over 10 years of fighting. How do you think it would play out when we lose 50% of our A-10's in the first two days and have 35-40 POWs? I can tell you for certain - the US public is not willing to deal with that."

...true that in the informational age one wonders how the public would deal with such losses...indeed, I've heard similar discussions on the contemplation of how U.S. citizens would have handled the losses and early set backs in World War II for example during the D-Day invasion and follow on attacks pushing inward had they been instantly streaming stateside...but at the end of the day I'm more persuaded by historians that argue that U.S. citizens could have handled the casualty rates/set backs in WWII even with instantaneous type coverage as today as they had been already generally been informed of the importance of our role in the conflict by our Civilian leadership...

...also, depending on the threat not so sure that we'd lose 50% of the A-10s in the first two days of all future conflicts...bear in mind that those loss estimates for defending against a Warsaw Pact invasion (and I think they would have probably been actually higher than 50% in the initial phases) were assuming the A-10s were going to be utilized primarily to fight across the forward lines to attack the Soviets second echelon armor forces...if utilized in future conflicts--depending on the threat--in a primarily CAS role the loss estimates might be less...in any event, one can only hope that the AF is not war planning with the public's anticipated reaction as its top consideration...it's also raises a legitimate question--is it the public--or the AF--that is becoming to risk adverse?

"I'm not suggesting jack - I'm telling you flat out (as I have MANY MANY MANY times before) - YES! Without a doubt our potential enemies' air to air capabilities have increased DRASTICALLY while we've been fighting these air to mud wars.Ask those of us who do this for a living (and have replied to this thread) - YES! FOR GOD'S SAKE THEY HAVE GOTTEN THAT MUCH BETTER AND THERE'S NO CHANCE IN HELL WE'D SEND THE A-10 IN THERE. If it's a true near-peer threat with a credible air-to-air presence there will be no A-10's flying in their combat radius until we kill/destroy or otherwise render useless (crater airfields?) the a/a threat."

...OK then, assuming arguendo, for a moment that your correct about the A-10s vulnerability...problem still is that in the context of the current A-10 debate the AF has over relied on this premise in their misguided attempts to prematurely divest the aircraft...more to the point, just who are these "potential enemies" that your referencing and when would we likely face them? and if we did, is it likely we would do so in a land war or more likely with Naval or Air assets?

...and even assuming a future land war--and we can discuss any specific area in the world you wish--but the bottom line is that a realistic assessment of the current threat and world scene for many years is that it is unlikely we will face a foe where the A-10 can't operate (or operate very quickly after hostilities commence accepting the AFs premises as to its vulnerabilities)...ergo--during the ensuing years the most likely scenarios our ground troops will face are in the so-called "mud wars" you reference which makes the A-10s retention even more justified...

...and, it's certainly not a matter of not respecting those "who do this for a living" as you suggest...and under those guidelines the public couldn't question the AF's current decision making process of utilizing supersonic bombers for CAS in The War on Terror when the A-10 would be more appropriate...this does bring up another current "problematic" tactic that the AF is utilizing in its A-10 debate: it is now having current AF pilots (with all the credibility the AF's wings garnishes with the public) in F35 transition discussing with the media/public not to doubt the F-35s CAS capabilities as after all it doesn't ultimately matter what type of aircraft "delivers the bombs"--or words to that effect...as a result, the public is being mislead on what is entailed with a CAS mission and impact the early retirement of the A-10 would have on our troops on the ground in the fight...

"It has nothing to do with "Current AF doctrine" - current Army doctrine states that we won't go into a prolonged surface battle before we gain and maintain air superiority. That has been the number one combatant commander objective since before Desert Storm. It is the absolute basis of what we do as a military."

...not exactly--what if the enemy attacks first?...the Army clearly understands that in future conflicts it might not be our choice on whether we go into battle before we have air superiority...if the enemy attacks the luxury of air superiority--such as in a Desert Storm scenario--may not be possible...and, that is why there is a necessity to plan for CAS under alternate scenarios...

... "We don't forward deploy Patriot. Small arms fire will not be effective against a robust a/a threat - they don't fly in those arenas and if they did they would be going WAY too fast to have any lasting damage from small arms".

...the Army has other organic air defense systems, like I said...and hard to say about the Patriot's deployment under all scenarios, and it's equally difficult to define what is "forward" under all scenarios...and, of course on the effectiveness of small arms fire--history tells us otherwise from what your suggesting...

"Well, it's definitive because that's what actually happens when you train with them. That's what their doc statement talks about, that's what they train to, that's what we train to protect them from. I don't know how to put it more clearly - this is fact."

...you've put it clearly--that's apparently the current A-10 doctrine...I hope I've been as equally clear that just because this is current AF doctrine that doesn't necessarily hold that it is the best utilization of the aircraft or that such doctrinal restrictions won't be discarded if the balloon goes up in future conflicts

"When the coast is clear? Sure - fly all day long. We aren't talking about that - like I said to start this whole thing - if there is a significant air threat the A-10 (and Army choppers) won't be flying. "

...depends on the definition of "significant" air threat? ... under the WW III scenario for example, certainly the Army's helicopters would have not waited until the "coast was clear" ...they wouldn't have even survived sitting on the ground until the "coast was cleared" had they not deployed

There won't be troops getting bombed by enemy fighters; there haven't been since April 15, 1953 - we aren't going to let that streak stop

...and, well done...no one is disputing that...but the AF also has historically performed poorly in the CAS role, providing medium tactical airlift for Army Commanders, and I'll save the continued neglect of our land based nuclear weapons systems for another time...

"Another pipe dream unfortunately - the US Army is only starting to grasp the cycle, requirements and scope that goes into a war-time ATO. Sure, the division commanders would be able to tell the A-10's where to attack and where to hold up. That works great in a no-a/a threat arena (already covered that part). The Army has absolutely no clue how to coordinate kill box deconfliction, tanker deconfliction, departure/arrival deconfliction, transitions to/from the AOR or how to work with the air war that would be (in your example) raging above (but somehow not affecting the A-10s). It just doesn't work for many of the reasons already covered."

...hardly a "pipe dream" as suggested--the merits of deploying fixed wing CAS assets under the operational control of Army Divisional Commanders is a legitimate tactical consideration that has been debated off and on in the Pentagon since the Korean War...

...and, the Army has already dealt extensively with many issues raised here such as "departure/arrival deconfliction" in many respects to include the extensive coordination that is required when it plans/conducts Air Assault Operations into the enemy's A.O.

...in any event, put some of the CAS fixed winged assets under Army operational control and you won't have scenarios like we have now with the AF providing CAS with supersonic bombers in a low threat environment...

"Don, you mention deploying A10s forward, under Army control. Two issues here. One is that the Hog is a crappy short field airplane. Lands short, but doesn't takeoff that way."

...not sure the designers would agree that the Hog can't takeoff in short field scenarios Jim...indeed, it was designed to operate in forward areas where our fast movers can't otherwise...if I'm correct--but not positive on this--I believe in some instances that in our current War of Terror it has been deployed and operated in areas that that our other Aircraft in inventory couldn't have until further improvements were made

"The bigger issue is Army control of CAS assets. The Army does a lot of things well, but in my limited experience as an ALO, effective use of air assets isn't one of them."

...you'd have to elaborate...historically, there have always been instances where the Army could have made more effective use of air assets...but as it pertains to CAS, I'd suggest the problem has been more of the AF providing the air assets and with the type of aircraft performing the missions...

"hi threat CAS has evolved to require effective standoff capabilities"

...that's what the AF is telling us presumably...many are not convinced...

The replies are getting too long to imbed each time, so I'll see if I can shorten it.

Unfortunately our military is often hamstrung by what our political leadership deems will be popular or politically correct. Look at the wars we've been fighting - we haven't for one minute been fighting to win, just to be there. (whole different discussion - not trying to open that up, just use it as an example). I wish I could say that PC doesn't have any affect on how we wage war, but it's just not true.

China and Russia are the big players on the block. Today the only places we could get into a significant air war (IMO) are China and Russia (or territory that one of them has control over). If we were fighting over water, the A-10 wouldn't be there either so not included in this discussion. Russia has long been exporting SU-30+ family around the world to anyone who wants to by them. China is going to export the J-31. The French and Israeli's sell jammers built specifically to deny US system capabilities (great friends of ours...) Anyone who has a billion dollars they want to throw at the problem can buy a very capable air force nearly overnight. Training is a different story of course, but it is easier by the day to get the gear. Today there's really only two places that this discussion is a factor. 5 or 10 years could make a big difference as we continue to draw down our military while everyone else is increasing theirs. We fly less, we are not developing new A/A missiles or aircraft (the F35 is not a capable a/a platform). Times are changing.

I'm not saying trash the A-10, they are great at what they do. I like the guys that fly them, I know the importance of having a single-mission airframe. I'm just trying to field some realism into the discussion - look back a few posts and you'll see - my point is really that IF there is a significant air threat, the A-10 won't be flying. How likely is that? Lets all hope it's not very likely at all - that will be bad for everyone any of us has ever met. If we continue in so-called "low intensity" fighting aka Iraq/Afghanistan (not my term, just one I've heard thrown around), the A-10 is awesome. Where do we get the sustainment money? Upgrade money? I'm all for getting rid of the F35 - it's not an aircraft we need and it's terrible at really just about any mission set you put it on. Even if we cut the F-35, we still have to buy new jets. Our Eagles have almost 10k hours on them, same for most of the F-16's. Can you imagine how long and how much money it would take to develop a replacement for all of our fleets? We also need a new tanker, we need a new AWACS, we need, we need, we need.... The list goes on. At some point we have to make cuts that we don't want to make.

The A-10 is an awesome platform and I hope it doesn't go. If it does I understand why.

Interesting idea if we had a conventional war where they attacked us first. We could end up with "forward" Patriots, though I imagine anyone with that capability (for first strike against us) would target those assets quickly - just like we would take down our enemy's IADs.

You mentioned changing doctrine and how the Army already has the capability to operate fixed wing assets. Changing doctrine? I'd love to - they all need to be changed. Will that happen? Not likely - even as stupid as it sounds, the US military will chop its own nose off to spite its face. Congress will be supplying the knife. The people who have the power to make decisions are often either uninformed, uneducated to the facts, have a personal agenda or just don't care enough to do the right thing.

Man, the USAF can't hardly get the arrival/departure deconfliction contracts correct in a real no-kidding fog and friction of war type of situation and we do this for a living. I'm sure you can find times that the Army has operated in that type of environment efficiently but those are definitely the exception, not the rule.

Imagine the sheer money and time problem the Army would have if we dropped the A-10 in their lap tomorrow. Training - how long to have competent pilots that have never flown attack aircraft? Years - several years. How long to have mechanics that know the systems and can stand alone work on it? Years. What about Army posts having the runways, hush houses, arming/dearming areas and other equipment needed to maintain the A-10. How long would it take to write and get approval for the entire new (never before seen) section of fixed wing jet attack Army regulations? How well do you think those regulations would fit into the already overly complex cycle of US war plans?

Keeping the A-10 is a money problem, handing them to the Army is a bigger money problem.

Not insurmountable though.

I work on a joint base. Army, Navy and Marine units there.

Give the Hogs to the Army, put some Hog drivers on an exchange tour for a while to train the next generation Army pilots, offer current pilots an interservice transfer.

Same deal for the maintainers.

No need for new infrastructure, training continuity and capabilities are maintained.

Just the name of the unit changes on October 1st.

I work on a joint base also. When it comes to aviation, we all do things WAY differently - and we are all convinced that we are right and the other services are wrong.

It takes years to build the experience flying jets to be ready to become an instructor pilot. Not everyone gets there. Until guys get good enough, who's training the next set of guys? The simple view you describe could never happen. New infrastructure would have to change - the Army doesn't have any regulations for fixed wing attack aircraft - those would have to be written. They don't have any policies or procedures for scheduling airspace, tankers, red flags, etc. All those have to be written - rewritten for stupid staff changes, then finally approved.

There would have to be congressional approval for this exchange program you mentioned also - never done before so they'd have some big fight over what they got paid, type and quality of housing, TDY locations, etc. These things seem small - and really they are - but the military is not flexible in this fashion and as much as you'd think "someone could make it happen" the truth is that someone could, but they won't.

The instructor core to have the capabilities to continue to train and upgrade people is only a time issue - but it can't be shortened. I'd say a new person to the airplane needs at least 4 years of flying to be ready for the instructor upgrade (after MQT, 2 FLUG, 4 FLUG, MCUG, etc). After that, you need SEFEs, you need school house instructors, etc, etc. Simply changing the name of the squadron doesn't come close.

Don, you wrote...."...but the AF also has historically performed poorly in the CAS role". I'd like to hear your facts in support of that statement. I'm just an ex-Navy guy here taking this all in but I knew a few guys, (Marines, for God's sake) with infantry experience back in the Viet Nam thing who were glowing in their appreciation for the CAS they received from the USAF.

Just anecdotal stuff on their part but your facts, please.

Steve

I should also add my father was to take command of a USAF P-80 outfit when the Korean conflict broke out. It became immediately clear the CAS mission required better on station endurance than jets could provide. The AF asked for volunteers with piston engine fighter experience and got an entire Wing of mothballed P-51s up to the Yalu in short order, my dad, Chappie James and a whole bunch more.

...interesting dialogue...

"Don, you wrote...."...but the AF also has historically performed poorly in the CAS role". I'd like to hear your facts in support of that statement. I'm just an ex-Navy guy here taking this all in but I knew a few guys, (Marines, for God's sake) with infantry experience back in the Viet Nam thing who were glowing in their appreciation for the CAS they received from the USAF.

Just anecdotal stuff on their part but your facts, please."

...poor AF CAS performance Steve in both the Korea and Vietnam Wars were actually the basis for the development of the A-10 in large part...multiple defense studies with input from all services concluded--and in large part based on these combat experiences and other factors--that in particular the fast movers were deficient in this role and that it was critical to develop a separate air frame specifically for the CAS mission...it was from those studies in large part that the A-10 was born...on page 1 of this thread I provided a link from PBS's: "How the A-10 became the most survivable plane ever built" in which Pierre Sprey--one of the original designers--provides an excellent summary of characteristics/capabilities required for a CAS platform...

...and that's one of the problems with the AF's unilateral attempts to cancel the A-10 presently...that they are ignoring the history of the decision making process that concluded a separate platform is required for CAS...all on the basis, presumably, of costs...

"I should also add my father was to take command of a USAF P-80 outfit when the Korean conflict broke out. It became immediately clear the CAS mission required better on station endurance than jets could provide. The AF asked for volunteers with piston engine fighter experience and got an entire Wing of mothballed P-51s up to the Yalu in short order, my dad, Chappie James and a whole bunch more."

...similarly, in Vietnam the AF utilized the Skyraider for CAS...that's fascinating on your Dad--and interesting in that I just completed a Veteran's History Project interview on an AF Vet that flew the Sabre in Korea during the period right after hostilities ended in that war (or at least when a cease fire was reached as hostilities have never really ended of course)

"China and Russia are the big players on the block. Today the only places we could get into a significant air war (IMO) are China and Russia ... 5 or 10 years could make a big difference as we continue to draw down our military while everyone else is increasing theirs. We fly less, we are not developing new A/A missiles or aircraft (the F35 is not a capable a/a platform). Times are changing."

...agree times are changing, and not for the best--but nonetheless the AF is still overplaying its hand in its lobbying to prematurely retire the A-10 when it claims the A-10 is not capable (presumably) to operate in a high intensity conflict...a high intensity conflict just doesn't seem to be on the horizon to the point as using it as current justification to dump the A-10...

...you mentioned air war--but I'm focusing on a ground war...I'd say it it is safe to assume that a young Infantryman graduating from Ft. Benning this year will be placed in harms way during his career over the next 20-25 years...also safe to assume that this combat will be in a low/mid intensity scenario that the A-10 could --without dispute--perform CAS...and 20 more years is about the life expectancy of the A-10-- so the A-10 could be kept in inventory during that time period while another CAS airplane was being designed...

...just can't see a major conflict with China on the horizon...they are more interested in gaining their advantages economically, and in any event any combat would more likely be regional in nature with our Naval assets being brought to bear--hard to see our Army in a land battle against the Chinese...same with Russia--there military will not be capable of engaging in large scale ground operations for some time...

"I'm not saying trash the A-10, they are great at what they do. I like the guys that fly them, I know the importance of having a single-mission airframe. I'm just trying to field some realism into the discussion - look back a few posts and you'll see - my point is really that IF there is a significant air threat, the A-10 won't be flying. How likely is that?"[/i

...I'm still not convinced the A-10 wouldn't be flying to some extent, and also keep in mind that in a high intensity conflict such as the World War III scenario the A-10 and Army choppers wouldn't survive on the ground for very long anyway if they didn't get into the fight...esp. in a scenario like when we were based in West Germany and other NATO countries where our airfields would be highly targeted by enemy air, long range artillery and missiles, special operation forces, saboteurs from sleeper cells, etc...

...but, I get your points/sentiment--and yours and Matt's position that the A-10 won't be flying without us having air superiority...this is undoubtedly the AF's strongest point in the debate...lot of dynamics at play on this topic and would be a good discussion over a beer someday

[i]"If we continue in so-called "low intensity" fighting aka Iraq/Afghanistan (not my term, just one I've heard thrown around), the A-10 is awesome. Where do we get the sustainment money? Upgrade money?"

...low intensity is the way I understand it as well, and not sure about where the money would come from without seeing the entire AFs budget...but my point is that it's just hard to believe this is all about the money or the AF would not be engaging in all the other misdirection otherwise..

"imagine the sheer money and time problem the Army would have if we dropped the A-10 in their lap tomorrow. Training - how long to have competent pilots that have never flown attack aircraft? Years - several years. How long to have mechanics that know the systems and can stand alone work on it? Years. What about Army posts having the runways, hush houses, arming/dearming areas and other equipment needed to maintain the A-10. How long would it take to write and get approval for the entire new (never before seen) section of fixed wing jet attack Army regulations? How well do you think those regulations would fit into the already overly complex cycle of US war plans?"

...all good points to be sure, but I tend to agree with Casey's post that any such problems are not insurmountable...the window has probably passed on the A-10--but the Army could certainly field the next generation CAS aircraft...

...the larger issue seems to be that if we are not going to integrate the AF back into the Army--and that is a pipedream--then it is logical that the Army be provided with fixed winged assets to complement its choppers to accomplish the CAS mission to some extent...carve it out to be a limited extent as necessary--but it's pretty clear the CAS mission is not one the AF covets and the "Key West" agreement is antiquated at this point...

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along the lines of costs and the CAS role posted below is an interesting interview with Sprey just last summer during the first round of Congressional Hearings on the A-10...have to respect his passion particularly on our troops and the close support mission



Pierre Sprey with R/T International

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nE7NDEYB5yU

...if your following the A-10 debate thru Congress your aware that just recently on the House side they reallocated additional monies to at least keep the A-10 flying thru FY 2016...interesting I saw on another Defense site was reference to an Amendment to that passed Bill brought by Rep. McSally (Retired A-10 Pilot/Squadron Cdr) that was debated and passed just this week (link cited below)...remarkably, it was deemed necessary the Amendment be crafted to ensure--that even after being provided additional funding--the AF could not "backdoor" further retirement (mothballing) of the A-10 as it has done the past several years in direct contradiction of Congress' intent...this Amendment also provided for an independent analysis on the capabilities required of the airplane that would eventually replace the A-10--presumably placed into the Amendment because of lack of faith of the AF's commitment to the developmental phase/selection of the next generation CAS platform...

...the debate shown below in the Youtube link--which runs for about 55 minutes as it pertains to the A-10 specifically--on the Amendment (which passed, and also included debate on a counter Amendment which did not pass) is pretty interesting

...highlights I saw included:

--generally speaking, the Representatives were not buying the AF's stated premise that other aircraft (fast movers/supersonic bombers) in inventory were a suitable replacement for the A-10 in the CAS role...that in particular the A-10 performed in situations where other aircraft could not...and, several stated it would be unwise to forgo a capability in the A-10 we presently have that cannot be replaced by current aircraft or the F35 in the future...

--McSally--in addition to providing a good summary of the A-10's capabilities--made several strong points to include highlighting the capabilities of the A-10 in the role of Rescue Mission Cdr for Search and Rescue...also, she brought up a significant point that the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea has recently indicated that the loss of the A-10 would create a gap in our anti-armor capabilities there...interestingly, McSally also expressed more confidence in the A-10 to withstand enemy air defense systems--in particular MANPADS--than I have heard otherwise from other AF personnel supporting dumping the A-10...

--some strong and emotional discussions from a Rep. that had a son in the Army currently in the fight and in talking with him and his son's fellow officers (and his Brigade Cdr) they strongly supported retention of the A-10 citing among other factors it provided the best CAS capabilities...that the bad guys often "scattered" when it came on station...

--evidence provided that as of just this week the AF was Still putting out false/misleading information that the A-10's retention would have on the F35 fielding schedule...

--very interesting discussion from a Rep. (retired Seal, Navy Commander--who has no doubt seen it all) that based on his experience in the military and now in Congress that with the current price tag of the F35 and regarding its use in a CAS role that: the last guy that will ever see it is the guy on the ground that needs it the most (or words to that effect)...he said clearly what many have been thinking for some time--that the AF will simply not risk losing the F35 by utilizing it in a traditional CAS role...



A-10 (note relevant parts pertaining to the A-10 start at the 12:40 mark and ends at 1:10)

4.29.2015 - H.R. 1735 Full Committee Markup

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zY1L0PmkfJQ

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...on a related note in this thread--Jim says: "...I'm sure they'd like to have the A-10. Since other systems can do most of that mission, it is presently an unaffordable luxury. Concerning abuse, F-15s land with half a wing, and 16s/18s etc are all amazingly tough. A-10 had a high loss rate in Desert Storm, and were restricted from ops in certain areas due to ADA threats. 30/40 year old ADA threats, operated by an incompetent, shattered third world military."

--I've been thinking over this comment and request that he or others please elaborate as this is quite an assertion and is somewhat in contradiction of history's recording of the A-10's overall relative success in Desert Storm...and in doing so please give your perspective on what is a "high loss rate" and in your analysis do so in comparison to other Coalition Aircraft losses in the Gulf War and include key factors such as relative sortie rates, difficulty/risk of assigned missions, operational readiness (mission capable rate), success of assigned missions as far as armor kills, etc...also, notwithstanding its capacity being severely diminished due to an extremely effective bombing campaign by our forces, provide analysis on reaching the conclusion that Iraq was a "third world" military...