And lots of 'em after that encounter !

And lots of 'em after that encounter !

Sean McDonnell at Professional Flight Training in Salina KS.
There are a number of good sources for Initial, but many feel he is the best and i concur. Fair, but tough. 15,000+ hours in the plane if I recall, an old freight dog.

He does some things a little differently, but I tried his method and it works.
When you are new to an intimidating airplane, you need less variables and that is his technique.

Example is his before landing (normal) routine:
Gear down
Flaps 5
Autopilot Off
Tip tanks off
Confirm 3 greeen no Red
Flick, flick, flick the trim nose up
Sync off
100%
Flaps 20
Review checklist and Done. Now all you have to do is fly.

He gives you the option of doing your own way, but believe me... just adopt his techniques cause when you screw up your own made-up procedure the 3rd time you are gonna get spanked (deservedly).

Notes
Taxi on the centerline - else incur the wrath.
Do NOT fly below minimum altitudes - see above.

And make sure you force him to go to lunch here: http://www.yelp.com/biz/cotijas-mexican ... ant-salina

From what I have read the MU is unforgiving to ones who beat their own drum

Thanks for the info

I've read the same thing and that is true to some degree.

There are a FEW things that are different on the plane: "The wing is the thing".
- Operating spoilers properly are a tad different than ailerons.
- Operating an airplane that truly needs flaps
- The TPE331 engine is different than a Pt6 or piston.

But everything else is so much the same.
-Avionics and Autopilot are normal.
-Pressurization is all same as anything else.
-IFR procedures no different.
-Cockpit layout is superior and easier than most
- Fuel management is virtually non-existant.

Sorry, I am straying from the original post... my bad.

Tj

Why the heck did she not land where she was, that plane may have had all sorts of other problems she had no idea about

I bet you'll find there are many more flameouts on the TPE-331 on other airframe types also, and *most* attributed to pilot error. I couldn't find that AD in the FAA's list, but the TPE-331 will have damage issues if the intake heat is used in warmer weather (i.e., 10 second limit on test above +5C in the Metro AFM that I an a Check Airman on).

I watched the video prior to reading the remainder of the comments, and had the same thought as TJ. Ignition may have been off, intake heat off, then when it was selected on due to "forgetfulness", both engines rolled back. I'd love the hear the rest of this story.

The TPE-331 will ingest an amazing amount of fod and keep running. I've seen birds, rags, etc with little effect during the last flight before removal. I've personally seen 4+" of ice on unprotected areas of the airframe during a 30 minute flight, and the engine intakes were clean. Large pieces of ice is one of the few things it will not eat and keep running.

My MU-2 time is limited to about 0.5 on a VFR day, but I have 2000+ hours behind the TPE-331 in the SA-226 and 227 during scheduled service, training, checking, etc. I've flown them in most of the worst regions of the US for ice with absolutely no concern about the reliability of that engine.

Jason Morford

We have a 10 second ground limit (for testing most of the heats) if I recall.

Don't remember any limitation above a certain OAT in the Mu in flight. It might be an "Airframe" part and because they are upside down on that airplane it is different?

Auto-ignition came later and we run it all the time no matter what.
Even so in real icing they recommend just run it continuously.

There are limitations on continuous use of ignition due to heat buildup in the box, but I think ours is the unlimited or 1 hour type.

Limitations are fun!
Tj

I think the lady in the C208 picked the wrong career.

I am very surprised that after a mayday call the controller does not tell all other traffic to go to another frequency so he can concentrate on this mayday plane

With regard to the MU2 emergency. Here are the captains comments I copied from another site, it sheds some light on a lot of the comments here:


I was the Captain of that flight and would like to add some facts and clear up some misconceptions posted by some. Firstly, I am an ATR rated commercial pilot with 13000 PIC hours in turboprop, turbojet and turbofan aircraft not an owner/operator and had extensive training in the operation of the MU2.

The flight route had reported cloud tops at FL190 and we were cruising at FL230 that night, the aircraft did not have weather radar and we entered cloud, heavy ice and executed a 180 within two minutes of encountering. The anti-ice systems were on and operable according to cockpit indications. We had a tailwind of 70 plus kts and once the turn was initiated the A/C could not maintain altitude with full power, torque and temp limiters off.

We descended into the cloud layer we had been above which further exasperated the icing problem. The critical problems occurred as the engines failed due to ice ingestion from the prop hubs as we descended into warmer air. The starboard engine failed and was feathered as per emergency checklist... while descending at 4000 feet per minute the port engine failed after and a restart was attempted, but unsuccessful due too severe first stage impeller damage from ice ingestion.

The starboard engine was them unfeathered and restarted, then I attempted a second time to restart the port engine, which was successful. Interestingly, post incident inspection showed cracked bleed lines running to the engine inlets, all cockpit indications showed green, valves open but bleed air was getting dumped overboard which resulted in ice build up on the engine inlets and reduced air intake performance.

Also and most importantly, this A/C did not have the optional pilot selectable ignition modification. It was the only A/C I have flown, and authorized by the MOT and the FAA at the time, to operate in icing conditions without it, if I had that option, the engines could have relit and the emergency would not have become so dire. The company retrofitted the A/C shortly after.

On another note, we descended to 3500 above SL, about 5 to 15 seconds from ground/lake impact and if not for the heroics of two IFR terminal controllers that night, Jim and his brother, who came over from a different sector and helped by transposing the radar image onto a topographical map and directing us over a valley, we would not be here, forever indebted, thanks guys. Also thanks to whoever posted this transcript, and all the encouraging posts from my fellow aviators.
Moray Isaac