I'm not that familiar, but wasn't the shaker going off?

Yeah I know, basic airmanship and all that - but a shaker and a big nose-down bias in the controls might lead some to think they were actually slow....

In an Airspeed Unreliable NN you can have the stall warning/stick shaker AND the Overspeed Warning ALL at the same time - THAT is why you set a known Pitch Attitude and Thrust to place the aircraft in a configuration where the aircraft CANNOT be stalling OR overspeeding. Then a quick glance across the panel comparing your IAS to the STBY ISFD and the FO IAS will, 99 times out of 100, resolve the issue.

Except when the TRE decides to make it more fun by taking them ALL out

Even then the aircraft is perfectly flyable.

You learned it on day one in a Cessna 152 - Pitch attitude plus power = Performance.

Its not just the airlines. Why is it most industries dont want to consider training? Its not like there are schools (and universities) that crank out trained (or educated) workers these days. Most workers think they can make it up with side hustles. (there are only so many hours in a day)

On my last contract I was asked to design something I had never done before. I said "no, I don't have that background". "Why not; Can't you just Google it?----

Seriously, Management only has goals and demands from above. No means or understanding of how to achieve them.

Plenty of Western crews are unaware of that as well. Air France 447 (15 deg nose up pitch at FL370 with Unreliable Airspeed) and Atlas crash in Houston (-1.0g, -47 deg pitch, and 430 kts)because he thought that a gentle rise to 5 deg nose high at 240 kts = stall, as if -47deg pitch as a valid response for any stall.

In violent agreement again Brett. FCTMs written with lawyers hovering and pilots who don't know the difference between 'should' and 'shall'.

A few years ago 'they' came out with a 'new' way of crosswind landing - where you land wings level in a crab. Ive seen that technique before - it was 'recommended' on the 767/777 I used to fly in very strong crosswinds and wet runways. Now it was the preferred method all the time.

When we were introduced to this technique (by an ex QF pilot who brown nosed his way into training with us after 25 years in the QF sheltered workshop where he never progressed past line pilot - for a reason - and who has since been sacked) I just said "I'm sorry but there is just no way I'll be doing that"

And I haven't. I didn't do it on the 767/777 and I aint starting now. I have good crosswind technique and I object to attempts at dumbing me down because other pilots don't.

After an extended absence from work last year due illness I came back to find two new FOs off our domestic fleet (Twin Otters and ATR72s) checked to line on the Boeing - but to whom crosswinds were deeply uncomfortable...both for them and to watch. The centreline was a mystery. They were just ugly. They were experienced so I figured the Boeing just had them a bit bluffed. OMG ITS A JET!!!

When I mentioned this to the other members of our very small training department they just shrugged.

So I've been working with them. Guys its just a big Twin Otter/ATR in a crosswind.

Just the other day the young female FO who struggled mightily did a gorgeous crosswind landing after I had described the correct technique on finals again and then let her have at it.

Katura that was a thing of beauty!!

Thanks Captain - I get it now.

Upset Recovery?

Recently a technique has come from somewhere and among the blurb describing the technique is a statement about putting the aeroplane 'in its happy place' .

I can't remember another word of the blurb. No doubt written by a highly intelligent individual with too much time on his hands.

Here is an idea. Make watching Captain Vanderburg vids like this one part of sim recurrent - which I have asked to be done time and time again but with no result - and then give them realistic scenarios in the sim.

[youtube]https://youtu.be/35Zy_rl8WuM[/youtube]

Plenty of Western crews are unaware of that as well. Air France 447 (15 deg nose up pitch at FL370 with Unreliable Airspeed) and Atlas crash in Houston (-1.0g, -47 deg pitch, and 430 kts)because he thought that a gentle rise to 5 deg nose high at 240 kts = stall, as if -47deg pitch as a valid response for any stall.

It's amazing how similar our recent experiences have been.

That unusual attitude video is great and should be mandatory viewing. I have plenty of experience going upside down, decelerating to near zero knots, etc. Not everyone does. One of my favorite events to teach is Upset Recovery Training because I get to cover a lot of concepts most people don't know, or forgot. Such as, a wing at zero AoA won't stall (break the AoA in an impending stall and you're 99% there already, keep the AoA low in a nose high situation and you won't stall), rudder is a high AoA control surface, ailerons are low AoA control surfaces, etc. The latest one is that turn radius is a function of two factors, true airspeed and g available. The Atlas crew pulled 4gs and still hit the ground. Why? They were doing 430 kts. Had the CA done nothing but deployed the speedbrakes and/or got the thrust to idle, they'd still be alive. FYI, he was just as lost as the FO; looking at the CVR transcript, the only thing he said was "what's happening?" I combine that info that he sat there and did nothing into the fact that, the way we train, we almost encourage the PM to just sit there and not do anything....so break that habit!

Took a recent USAF KC-46 (767) Formal Training Unit (FTU) grad into the sim and just gave them some visual patterns/crosswind langings to warm up on, and watched that wings-level crab landing technique. I said "what are you doing, use alieron and top rudder to straighten it out" and they said "What?" They had done nothing but crab landings in that airplane. It was the same when it came to unusual attitudes, stalls, etc...just a timidness all around. V1 cuts and SE approaches and use of automation were solid, but all the other fuzzy piloting stuff not so much.

Your and my numbers are very similar: Climb below 10k = 10deg, above 10k = 6deg and N1 around 100%; Cruise = 1-2 deg and 90%; 290 descent = -1deg and Idle. In my brief, even Initial Training (ITU), I ask the students what the cruise pitch is, and many (most) in ITU say "I don't know, I haven't been to cruise much yet". I ask them if it matters, name a modern transport aircraft that doesn't cruise at 1-2 deg with the thrust levers about right there (move the thrust lever to somewhere around 3/4). I ask experienced crews what's the most extreme pitch you'd see in any flight regime (to know when something is wrong) and not everyone knows.

Regarding your "leave it where it is" comment, obviously, that's if you're in stable flight....but that's not obvious to all. Had a crew allow the nose to get all the way down to -25 deg pitch (hint for the non-767 flyers, it never should have been allowed to go past -5 deg at the most, if even that far) and 90% thrust as the automation tried to maintain airspeed in a descent where the pitot systems were blocked similar to AF 447. Because they were descending when it happened, the airspeed started to decrease with lower altitude and the automation kept lowering the nose and pushing up the power to regain the speed. The CA, when he finally realized something was wrong, punched everything off and just held that 25 deg / 90% while calling for the QRC which contained the immediate action pitch/power settings. He wasn't going to set a pitch/power until the FO got to that step of the QRC. Unfortunately, after only a few seconds, the sim froze and gave the red screen of death as the aircraft accelerated through 400 KCAS (sim limit). Debriefed.

Interesting sidenote about that Airspeed Unreliable QRH. When it comes to the step that says "Reliable Airspeed can be determined - yes/no", the majority of pilots interpret that to be "make your best guess." And many just guess the one closest to the speed at the top of the performance chart they used; as long as it's within that 30kts mentioned in the QRH, it must be right....right? I remind them that's not the question; even an incorrect indication can just happen to be within 30kts right now, and if there is a doubt, there is no doubt. But many pilots apparently can't even consider not having a reliable IAS indicator available to them, so they'll choose an indicator that may or may not be accurate. "If the computer is telling me my airspeed, that must be it." I've even had crews swich over one side to the other's ADC because the QRH drove them there, then later use the fact that the two indications agree that they must be right .......they are using the same output!!!

Side Side note: Many pilots will also try to use the TAS display as a crosscheck of the IAS. I mean, the computer is giving a very specific TAS, like 473kts, so it must be correct. I ask them if the TAS is independent of IAS, and most of the younger pilots do not know the answer - I'm pretty sure many have not have had to do TAS calculations given the technology they learned on. I have to point out that TAS calculation start with IAS, so if the IAS is wrong......

Indeed - by 'leave it where it is' or 'do/change nothing' I mean set/maintain pitch and thrust where it SHOULD BE or WAS before the event began.

About 5 or 6 years ago I had an Airspeed Unreliable departing Sydney. Weather along the entire east coast was TRULY evil. About 3-4000' I noticed my ASI doing strange things - FO was PF, A/P B engaged.

There sure as sht was no flailing arms, disconnecting, and madly setting silly pitch attitudes and thrust setting.

After sitting quietly and watching/comparing/checking for 5 seconds.

Hey Nigel look at my ASI bouncing all over the place. It was going up and down 100+ kts from where it should be.

Oh yes captain.

What do ya reckon we should do?

Up to you captain.

Well another couple of thousand feet and we'll be in icing conditions instead of just heavy rain so how about I get you a level off?

Up to you captain.

And on it went through (unhelpful) NNCs, holding to burn down near landing weight and landing.

How much fuel would you like to leave the holding pattern with to land under MLW Nigel?

Up to you captain

He stayed PF (actually more like voice activated AP. ), A/P B remained engaged, including an ILS to below FO minima (FO minima higher than published minima), they changed out my side rosemount probe and we launched for home again...and you can bet we had a chat about his response to my every attempt to get him to make a decision.

Nigel I know there are captains in the fleet who are so insecure they would rip you a new a'hole for having the temerity to voice an opinion. One day you're going to be sitting here and when we fly together, and YOU are PF, I WANT you to TELL ME what we need to do next - I won't get upset - if you suggest something I think is less than great I'll speak up. But you might come up with something that never occurred to me and is awesome...at which point I shall pretend like I had thought of it too

Truly nice fella - now a respected captain on the ATR.

I have had enough real events over my career, thick smoke in the cabin from a jet engine surging and stalling itself to death, loss of cabin pressurisation control/rapid descent, the above, bunch of engine failures and instrument failures in IMC, to know REAL ones are sometimes not like simulated ones.

On my very first takeoff in a transport category aircraft ( DHC Dash 7) on my endorsement (no sim) the IP (Fleet Captain) failed the number 4 engine and I launched into the 'drill' calling out instructions for him to do sht at about 1 thing per second.

He just sat there slumped sideways in his seat looking at me with a bemused smile as I climbed straight ahead, #4 having auto feathered....until I lost momentum and looked back enquiringly.

Chuck...sit back, relax, ENJOY your emergency - I'm old, I can't move that fast.



Now I'm old

Best advice I ever got.

Something I've always wondered, on jets with INS systems that show flight path angle....

Why aren't the memory items for pitot/static problems:

1. Pull up the FPA and put it on the horizon

2. Put the throttles somewhere in the middle third of travel......

Because it's all integrated these days. Our QRH specifically says that FPV is not reliable with pitot/static anamolies. Same with AoA. Doesn't make sense to me, but it is what it is.

I love the FPV (Flight Path Vector) and have it up all the time. Unfortunately its not on the list of things that are still reliable in a 737-800NG Airspeed Unreliable (an extreme example anyway).

Its been over 10 years since I flew the 777 and my memory might be faulty but I believe it was still reliable on that aircraft. But don't quote me.

The 767-300ER I flew before the 777 didn't have a FPV.

It's really not that hard to have a few numbers in your head that puts the aircraft in a stable flight path condition. The most likely place is just airborne (bird strike on pitot tube) 10NU and stiff arm the thrust levers. Climb to a safe altitude comparing the ASIs, check pitot heat is on. At MSA set 5NU/65%N1. Check QRH relevant checklist reference items and performance inflight tables and fine tune NU/%N1 for weight. Compare the ASIs to what the QRH says they should read, hand over to pilot with the reliable flight instruments.

Cruise ensure 2NU/90%N1 (737-800 - memory dims might have been closer to 1NU in the 777) and as above.

On descent ensure -1ND/flight idle and as above.

And yet for some strange reason Boeing changed the NNC from assuming pilots could do the above to defined pitch attitude and thrust settings that (sorta) worked on every aircraft they build.

I'd LOVE to see a Boeing test pilot defend that.

Yep that's the answer I got.

Just doesn't make sense to me....I was a flight test engineer on INS-equipped aircraft before I was a pilot. I'm not aware of pitot-static corrections to attitude data. And good luck researching that in the systems manual....

For that answer of why it's no longer valid, you don't need to talk to the Boeing engineers, you need to talk to the Boeing lawyers!! FWIW, in the simulator, I've yet to find an airspeed indication malfunction where the FPV isn't valid.

And modern manuals aren't detailed enough to get any answers to any question.

"OEM's have a history of growing models until they can't."

The DC-8 , 727, and 737 are three examples. Easy to put "plugs" in the fuselage. Those who have flown these planes and haven't had the tail skid meet the runway raise your hands. I can't raise mine.

I lost my virginity on the stretched DC-8 on my last flight as an FO coming out of Cologne. The Stretch 8, DC-8 -73, had a tail strike pitch attitude of 8.9 degrees nose up on rotation. Colonge had a dip in the middle of the takeoff run where planes rotate, making it easier to get the skid.

It was barely perceptible, only requiring re-painting the skid; it didn't compress the cartridge. The company said "No more DC-8 for you!" and put me in the left seat of the 727.