In how many flight hours is that and how does that compare to the Mu2?

Mike just can't find any useful data to answer your question. You can research as well as I can.

I'm not sure how reporting a fact is stacking the deck. What would be stacking the deck is conveying an impression that PC-12s don't have fatal accidents. Alas, they do.

Well, to be more precise, PC-12 pilots have fatal accidents. The machine is rarely the main issue.

Mike C.

My take as a former SERIOUS MU2 fanboy (went to PROP, took engine course) ...

My interest in them have faded after Pascal Goesslin and Perry inhofe died. I've been putzing around aviation for 20 years now and have managed to know two people I respected highly who died in MU2's post SFAR. To my recollection, I've not known people who died in KA's, PC12's, Bonanzas, 182's, 421's.

Anecdotal, but still makes me nervous.

Charles,

I can see how you’d think and feel the way you do with two accidents hitting close to home. Stepping back a bit, consider that one accident was the first solo flight post training (no mentor) for a pilot with no turbine experience. The other flight was launched in a high stress, emotionally charged situation in weather that shut down regional airlines. I think that both these accident just happened to be MU2s but the result could have easily been the same in any other TP. Just my 2 cents.

A statistic is easy to dismiss, a person you know is not.

Mike C.

A statistic is easy to dismiss, a person you know is not.

Mike C.

You don't often see folks (even noobs) lose an engine in day vfr descending to an airport and lose control. That's what happened to Perry. Sold me on the absolute value of a mentor pilot but still very unsettling

Pascal's accident has many more contributing factors, but as mike has pointed out, there's still not a good explanation for how the crash happened.

Not telling anybody else what to do, just talking about how my feelings have evolved. I call BS on a lot of things (e.g. traffic avoidance/midairs) with the general argument of "show me the bodies." There are more bodies here than I can get past.

The MU2 is still the plane I want to own if I could find a way to afford one...but I do pause at my friend Pascal I knew since he had his Cardinal days and also Nathan who I knew from his Bonanza days. I had pretty much made peace with the Pascal incident but I still struggled with Nathan's. The airframe on the MU2 is about as stout as they get so I have trouble with what looks like an inflight breakup.

Ok I still want one...just less enthusiastic... beauty is in the eye of the beholder. I have only flown in the back of one years ago but the price / performance still seems difficult to beat the other options. If I win a small lottery (ok I only play about once a year so the chances are slim! ) or I end up starting a buisness that can support expense of a TP then I am in...

Jeff

You don't often see folks (even noobs) lose an engine in day vfr descending to an airport and lose control. That's what happened to Perry. Sold me on the absolute value of a mentor pilot but still very unsettling

Pascal's accident has many more contributing factors, but as mike has pointed out, there's still not a good explanation for how the crash happened.

Not telling anybody else what to do, just talking about how my feelings have evolved. I call BS on a lot of things (e.g. traffic avoidance/midairs) with the general argument of "show me the bodies." There are more bodies here than I can get past.

Pascal's accident's final TSB investigation report is not yet out. But there is a preliminary report which shows the detailed flight path preceding the crash just short of the runway. The information was sourced from a non-TSO'd GPS/FDR. It's here for those who care to see it. It's scary stuff:

http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-i ... 6a0032.asp

Clearly, the aircraft was not on anything remotely close to a stabilized approach. So far, nothing mechanically wrong was found with the aircraft. I'll wait for the final report to come out, but all indications are pointing to pilot error.

I still think the MU2 is an amazing aircraft with great manufacturer support, even though the youngest one is 30+ years old. That's the Japanese way of doing business - think long term, not just the next quarter. The MU2 is still on my short list for my next personal airplane.

Fly Safe!
Alan

A king air 350 to an MU2? Not knowing the RW capabilities of either by year or model, but as an outside observer that seems very lateral?

Chip-

By the airline definition of a stabilized approach, you are correct. Some people will stick with that. Mike C has posted extensively on this and made the argument, compelling to me, that whatever you think of the approach it may have been something that played out exactly as Pascal planned until it departed controlled flight. I personally make a distinction between a flight condition that, though atypical, is planned and anticipated compared to something that just barrels along with the pilot along for the ride never knowing what's about to happen next. The latter condition is the problem that "stabilized" approaches were meant to fix.

Chip,

You are correct and I should specify. The King Air 350 belongs to my corporate client. Nevertheless, as an engineer going strictly by the numbers, the MU2 presents more value than a similar KA (speed / fuel burn / pax / hangar footprint / overhauls / etc.). Unfortunately, circumstances dictated that the KA was the market winner and survivor. Few corporate departments will ever gravitate towards the MU2 today - age being one conspicuous factor - but for my family's needs, the MU2 is currently in the running.

Charles, since my move to corporate from the airlines, my airline training simply does not allow me to even consider an unstabilized approach. It's merely one of the reasons airlines remain steadfastly atop the safety statistics. (By the way, I published a book last fall on airline safety, how it compares to corporate and private aviation safety, and a few other topics. It's called "The Next Plane Crash" and is available on my website thenextplanecrash.com . Sorry for the shameless plug!

Even without that training, barreling down at nearly 2,000 fpm and 220 knots at the inner marker (4 miles final) in icing IMC sounds like, well....'nuff said. I'll just add that I would be very surprised if those were his actual intentions. As I said previously, many are awaiting the final TSB report, myself included.

Thanks everyone for your contributions to BT. It's great reading everyone. The fact that this is not an anonymous forum keeps everyone civil and constructive!

Happy holidays and fly safe!

Alan

Mike makes a compelling case that pascals approach could easily have been purposeful asva way to minimize time and distance in bumpy, icy IMC.. Maybe unwise but still purposeful.

Airlines have a terrific safety record. They have an atrocious cost/convenience /service record. GA pilots receive cost/convenience/service at the risk of killing ourself and innocents too. That’s just the nature of the beast.

The approach is not particularly extreme. The graph presented exaggerates the steepness. Pascal was one speed and in landing configuration when he hit the 3 degree approach slope point. The slope seems quite purposeful, and while it may be classified as unstabilized, it does not seem out of control.

The plane rolled to an extreme bank angle (~90 degrees) very quickly after the autopilot was turned off. There are possible mechanical causes for this (flaps, props, engines), and there are possible pilot causes (disorientation). The TSB report is not out yet to detail what they think.

I'm having a hard time thinking Pascal, after gliding down a descent angle for 6+ minutes, suddenly racks the plane knife edge into the ground. His airplane was well equipped, G600, synth viz, etc, so there's really no reason he would be disoriented at that moment and yet content with how the autopilot was flying up until that point.

Mike C.