"I'm a former Hog Driver, and would love to see it stick around, but I think OEF/OIF has done some damage to legacy warfighting abilities. Gotta get ready for the next one, not the last one."

Word! How many times have our military planners fallen on that sword? Probably every one except OEF. That one caught us at the top of our game.

...about getting ready for the next one--of course, "getting ready" is exactly the concern the Army planners have if the AF is successful in making the F-35 the next CAS aircraft...

...along those lines, interesting editorial/article in the National Review released today (referenced below) in strong support of the A-10 retention that I thought might be relevant to this ongoing dialogue...the article does an exceptional job in discussion of the key topics and the dynamics of the CAS mission; and in debunking the AF's deceptive "survivability" arguments and "single-mission" characterization of the A-10...significant in it's harsh criticism of the AF in the middle of the ongoing A-10 debate--and a new theory introduced that the AF (in addition to the other well documented deceptions) has actually underutilized the A-10 in the most recent combat actions to justify dumping it...it's an important article esp. considering the National Review is one our country's most long standing publications--and is widely respected on defense issues...

...brutally candid--the National Review author categorizes the F-35 CAS capabilities as "firing and fleeing":

"Even if the F-35 meets current projections, its limited close-air-support capability will not come online until at least 2021, and its CAS will largely be limited to 'firing and fleeing.' While lobbing in expensive precision-guided munitions from great distances can be useful in many scenarios, it is a far cry from the kind of CAS of which the A-10 is capable."

...thinking thru this issue it occurred to me that there isn't really any historical precedence for the nature of this A-10 retention debate...in this instance we have Congress, the civilian aircraft designers, and the country's respected publications all demonstrating more knowledge of/and passion for the Infantry's mission and the Infantry's CAS requirements than the AF does...astonishing...can't think of any parallel in history with any weapon system and service missions

_____


THE NATIONAL REVIEW
THE CASE FOR THE WARTHOG

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/4 ... fredenburg

The AF isn't alone in playing these kind of games. I recall wondering out loud to my shipmates why the Navy was so dead set on developing the FA-18 which, particularly in its A/B variants, was extremely limited in its ability to fulfill the attack role. The Navy had floated an idea of an F-12 in about 1969 that was a composite of A-4 Skyhawk cockpit and wingbox, Harrier engines and controls and some other existing hardware that was in production or readily available (hence way cheaper than a new aircraft program). The F-12 was supposed to use a modified lift fan for reduced (not vertical) takeoff run and would have been deployable as a low cost, day fighter/attack aircraft from smaller, less costly carriers. One of the more senior guys present in the conversation turned to me and said "Steve, that's exactly why the Navy doesn't want the F-12. They won't do anything to encourage the concept of a smaller, less expensive, throw away carrier."

The USAF 2-Star that said, "If anyone accuses me of saying this, I will deny it ...” “Anyone who is passing information to Congress about A-10 capabilities is committing treason.”

Major General James Post III has been removed from his post, Vice Commander of the Air Combat Command, and issued a letter of reprimand.

Placing the F35 into CAS is just silly. Or plain stupid, depending on who you ask.

But I don't see anybody complaining about the megabucks being spent on it. Or any objections to it replacing the F15,16,18...the F22 is barely operational.

Where are you looking? I see people (myself included) talking about what a waste of time and money the F35 program is - it's nearly a daily topic for most warfighters.

...entirely appropriate for the Vice Commander of the Air Combat Command to be relieved for threatening subordinates who might dare to talk to Congress about the capabilities of the A-10...very troublesome though that it took Congressional influence to make the AF take action on this

...even more troublesome is that this was not an isolated incident...that--in addition to the predictable AF "beltway politics" utilized to protect their own parochial interests--AF Leadership and AF pilots/personnel stationed outside D.C. have weighed in on the A-10 and CAS debate and employed deceptive methods/misinformation to mislead Congress and the American Public...many examples of AF leadership and personnel outside the beltway being deceptive on the issue--most recently was the commentary coming out of the AF's recent "CAS Summit"

...no matter what the future holds for the A-10, this is a sad Chapter in the history of our Armed Forces

Reading back through these posts which, including my own, I had forgotten about, reminds me of a book by Col. David Hackworth, USA titled About Face. Although weapons procurement wasn't the central thesis, he described the tension within US military leadership between the "Career Manager" and the warrior. The latter just wants to get the mission done, is often a little rough around the edges, will take risks and is capable of acting and leading when the crap hits the fan, as it always will. The former is never going to stick his or her neck out, scrupulously avoids any controversy that might endanger a career, is not an effective combat leader, never feels comfortable in the presence of those that are and will not tolerate opposition to dogma ordained by Beltway leadership, which is mostly comprised of fellow career managers.

Absent an immediate threat to national security, any dissent from the operational or actual combat side is dealt with severely, the warriors get canned or learn their place and the debt doesn't come due until another crisis hits when the career managers prove incapable of performing their most important function, combat leadership. The call then goes out and the Robin Olds, Chappie James, Pappy Boyingtons, Chuck Yeagers and Jim Flatleys answer the call, but they will get pushed into the background when the crisis is over.

Care to guess which stage of this cycle we're in today?

If anyone is really interested in how the pentagon really works, they need to read a book called "Boyd" the fighter pilot who changed the art of war by Robert Coram. I goes into detail what happened inside the pentagon when a small group tried to convince & trick the upper brass into building what eventually became the F16,18 & A-10. He was undoubtedly a very smart man, but maybe not the most perfect person ever born.

...interesting Hackworth and his book "About Face" is brought up in the context of this discussion by Steve...if he were alive today, not much doubt on what side "Hack" would fall on in the A-10 debate...for those not aware, Hack was a solid Infantry leader with significant combat experience in Vietnam and Korea (where he was awarded a battlefield commission)...at one point I believe he was our Country's most decorated soldier on active duty during his time...while still in the Army during Vietnam he spoke out openly (and with the press as well) about the Army's problems in Vietnam to include the "career manager v warrior" dichotomy Steve pointed out; as well as other systematic problems of the Army in Vietnam to include Infantry Bn Cdr's being rotated out of Command positions too quickly, not being proficient in their "craft" as he was fond of saying, not being on the ground with their troops and leading from the front, etc...

...on a larger scale regarding Vietnam--he spoke candidly about the Politicians that tied the hands of the Military and prevented them from fighting the War in a way that was required to win...also, he pointed out that historically America doesn't do well maintaining its Army in a high rate of readiness in preparation for the next conflict, and as a result we have examples such as Korea and Vietnam where we went to War not as fully prepared as we could have been...Hack also notes the irony and problems that ensued by the Army putting Westmoreland--a fine officer in many respects, but an Artilleryman nevertheless--in charge of a predominately Infantry War in Vietnam...personally, I thought Hack crossed the line when he went to the Press--and those on this forum with Vietnam experience know the most on these topics of course--but many of his points about the Army were well taken and you've got to respect a soldier that earns a Battlefield Commission in Korea...predictably, Hack had a falling out with the Army shortly after his Vietnam service and retired...

...Hack in his book also emphasized that despite any problems that the Army did have in Vietnam--that at the small unit level in many instances our soldiers were fighting skillfully/bravely and deserved more respect than than they ever received from the U.S. Public...interesting too with his Combat experience and knowledge of history he flet that in many ways Vietnam was the toughest War that our Infantry have fought citing for instance the difficulty of fighting in that environment day in and day out in the enemy's backyard--and the fact that app. half of our casualties were from booby traps and mines which made it tough psychologically on the troops...

...Hack's book, "About Face"--which also included valuable leadership lessons from his Korean Combat experiences--was written after Vietnam while he was on a self-imposed exile of sorts in Australia...interesting in the context of Steve's thoughts on which "cycle" our military is currently in--the next generation of Army Infantry Officers following Vietnam studied and learned from any Army shortfalls in Vietnam...Hack's book has been widely read by Army Officers and following his return to the States from Australia he was embraced by Army leadership and invited to visit our Combat Training Centers and active units and so on...Hack's observations of the Army during this post Vietnam and pre-Desert Storm/War on Terror period included that the Army had made improvements in its training regime and in particular development of its Infantry Bn Level leaders...as far as the Army leadership today and performance in the War of Terror-- it's my sense that Hack would believe they are performing well and that generally the Army is promoting the right Officers...

...as it pertains to current AF leadership and the "warrior versus career manager" issue and is currently being promoted, I have my opinions like everyone else--but I'm not really that knowledgeable...I do believe however that the recent A-10 and CAS debate has highlighted that the AF's problem is not necessarily the type of leader it is promoting, but rather more of a long standing and systematic disdain (at worst) or ambivalence (at best) regarding the CAS mission among its Officers (generally speaking)...and the fact that AF Commissioned Officers would compromise their integrity by misleading and not being truthful with Congress/American Public on the A-10 and CAS issues just to facilitate the early retirement of an airplane is quite troublesome...

...there is certainly an argument that could be made that the AF has outlived its usefulness as a separate Branch to the extent that it still doesn't fully embrace our Country's troops on the ground and the CAS mission...hard to predict the future on all of this, but it's fairly certain that Congress will keep the A-10 alive for some time to come...and after that, we know the AF's CAS plan is to utilize the F35 and its supersonic bombers for the mission...doesn't inspire much confidence...one can hopefully envision momentum for the Army to be given more leeway and resources (fixed wing) towards performing some of it own CAS missions at some point in the future...

CAS isn't an airframe, it is a mission. There are a lot of airframes that can do CAS, in 99% of the instances, as well or better than the A10. The issue is aircrew training and proficiency. When you have a single mission airframe, you train to that mission, to the exclusion of all else. Currently there are a number of airframes capable of doing good CAS. The AC130 is awesome in that role, in certain scenarios.
Unfortunately the USAF can't afford to fund the level of CAS the Army would like, and still pay for other missions. Neither can the Army, even if they were given the aircraft. It comes down to budget choices, and the sad reality that we can't afford everything we would like to have in the military.
There are always a few leaders who misbehave. By and large though, most of the military leaders are good men and women with more info than you or I have, and they make hard choices about what does or doesn't get funded.
The A10 was a good, but not great, airplane. Read some of the Desert Storm after action reports.

There is not another airframe that can provide CAS support equal to an A10 -- that I'm aware of. The A10 was born to do CAS.

The AC130 is "awesome" as long as there is no air defense threat to it. Otherwise it is a large, relatively slow moving target. One got shot down in Desert Storm.

The A10 protects its pilot in a titanium "bathtub". It was made to take abuse if necessary. I found this interesting story about an A10 that acquired "378 holes" in it and flew home safely. http://www.cradleofaviation.org/history/aircraft/a-10_survivability.html

The A-10 isn't survivable as soon as you put enemy fighters up, but they do better in SAM territory than an AC-130 for sure.

Yes, but you guys eliminate the enemy fighter threat in the first few days, or the enemy is afraid to launch them in the first place.

That's the idea. It's getting harder and harder to do though - everyone else knows that's the idea so they've been putting a lot into winning the A/A game while we've been busy in two non-air wars. Hopefully it won't happen, but if something does kick off it will be a new kind of air battle in terms of parity that we haven't seen since 'Nam.