Mike,
Well said and I agree that man and mission are siginifant factors for the safety of a flight. But machine is also a factor, design certification helps equalize much of the risk between similar types (Pistons, turboprops, and turbojets) but there is still a difference in risk between machines. In orther words, take the same well trained pilot and put him in two different machines and there will be a difference in risk depending on machine complexity (human factors) and machine redundancy.

I suspect that insurance underwriters are only ones that have the data needed to normalize the other risks (pilot backgrounds, training, mission) and effectively evaluate the risk of the machine.

I agree.

The TBM is primarily owner flown for personal or business transportation.

The PC12 is mostly flown commercially for corporate, utility, cargo.

Different ecosystems, different results.

If you could swap every TBM for a PC12 and vice versa, you'd find that the airplane made only a little difference if any. I realize that you can't do the swap like that due to different capabilities, but it is exactly that different capability that has caused the two planes to be used differently.

Mike C.

Generally, this effect is so small it is covered up by the man and mission differences.

That is, you won't see it in the accident data, certainly not at the coarse level we can access it from the NTSB web site.


I spent some time talking to an underwriter (not broker) who writes for many types including twin turboprops. He basically said there isn't that much sophistication in the process. There isn't enough money in the policies to justify a team of actuaries to study this in great detail for all the types of GA airplanes. So the underwriter basically uses some fairly general rules of thumb that get tweaked by profit/loss and the competition. If they write too high, they don't get business. If they write too low, they lose money. So those tendencies are tuned over time.

In essence, he said the ability to compute a precise risk for any one policy doesn't exist so you hope to get a general feel in the aggregate and write against that.

He did say that the person (man) and the usage (mission) played more role in liability considerations (basically, will you crash) then the machine did. The machine did play more of a role in the hull coverage due primarily to what it costs to repair (what it costs to fix if you crash) and not so much any risk factor it created of its own accord.

Mike C.

Brent-
The PC12 loss in 2009 with 14 fatal (many of those being children) is likely skewing the data per your comment. Sadly the 2012 loss in Florida which has been commented on recently involved a total of 6 fatalities. Those two accidents I believe are where the majority of the 'numbers' lie with respects to the PC12 fatal losses.

Deciding which airplane to buy is a factor you can completely control. Therefore I do think it is still useful to study the data, as opposed to declaring they are all exactly the same.

Safety is also a function of time: For example, buying an MU-2 for a period of time after first came out appears to be less safe overall, because of the initial training standards for that plane. It is not because of the plane itself, but you might not have known about it. Similarly, if you had bought a Cirrus to fly in night mountain icing (Klapmeier video) because of the chute, you might have been less safe because the "risk compensation" was not adequately understood. Similar to twins, they used to be cheaper to insure than singles, until someone figured out they were not, at that time anyway.

For better or worse, each of those count only as 1 fatal accident in the statistics when we talk about "fatal accidents per 100K hours". The stats would be the same if they had only the pilot aboard.

A different stat would be "deaths per 100K hours", but that isn't typically discussed or measured.

Mike C.

Can you suggest a viable methodology to study just the impact of the aircraft itself?

I've not found one.

I don't disagree the machine has an effect, I just can't find a good way to measure it against the background "noise" of the other factors.

Every meaningful change in accident history came about by changing the man or mission and not the machine.

Swap in King Airs doing overnight check hauling like MU2s did, and they would have a similar experience. It is just the nature of that work.

Mike C.

I recently spoke with a former check hauler while he and I were walking up to my airplane. He has something like 6000 hrs. in Mits hauling checks among much more time flying other stuff. He's an excellent pilot and has balls of steel. The guy just doesn't get excited about anything, you know the type.

So, during our walk to the airplane, I ask him if he checked the WX; I did, I just wanted to go over it with him. His comment to me was, "Nah, it don't matter, we're going anyway".

?

Those guys are a different breed. I don't think it would matter what the equipment was, if you have that attitude, you're eventually going to wind up a statistic. Lots of guys did that job and probably weren't as sharp as this guy.

I think if you want to make valid comparisons you need to use the "fatality per 100,000 metric and filter out data such that you're comparing sector against same sector (ie...owner flown vs. owner flown, not owner flown vs. insane check hauler).

While I somewhat hesitantly dip a toe in here....

I fly at night regularly, in the mountains to and from a vacation cabin, and in IMC because I'm on a schedule. The Bonanza made me nervous (after an engine indication problem at night coming back from Austin).

The Cirrus with it's terrific chute save rate helped with that. BUT, I didn't make the switch until their fatality rate dropped dramatically over the last three years. And it continues to improve. As mentioned, one of the safest pistons you can fly, statistically, now.

And, yes, I fly at night and in IMC more, and more comfortably. But I flew in it in the Bo, as well. And with never a fatality when a chute is pulled over 1k ft, and below Vne, that brought warm fluffy feelings.

Hold on. I'm getting to your point.

Is it the chute that made it the safest? No. Did it help. Yes. What changed three years ago? Training.

So... I bought the Cirrus because of the safety that had been demonstrated in the airframe. Because of that, I bought in to the CULTURE of safety that is now present within the owner group. After a few hundred hours in 182's, and 600 hours in the Bonanza flying in all kinds of weather, I still took a 5 day course from a Platinum CSIP (Cirrus Super Trainer). Because that's what the Cirrus safety culture says to do. If I wanted the results, I had to buy in to it all.

If you read COPA, now, there is much less about the parachute, but much about the safety of flying. Much more so there, than here. The level of participation in CPPP is more than twice that of BPPP (or BPT). And they just started a new initiative to double that.

I believe the stats continue to improve because more people are attracted to the plane because of the increased safety record. If that's what attracts them, and they buy into the culture of safety training, than it makes a difference.

As fatalities have gone down, pulls have gone up. I think it's a demonstrative difference.

But it wasn't until training was emphasized that the numbers became impressive.

Culture, or airframe? A bit of both, but more culture.

Not that different than the MU-2, I would assume.

So, yes, I think a choice in an aircraft can make a difference. And the aircraft itself, sometimes, can make a small difference. But, although subtle, the choice and not the aircraft, can be more the determiner.

While I somewhat hesitantly dip a toe in here....

I fly at night regularly, in the mountains to and from a vacation cabin, and in IMC because I'm on a schedule. The Bonanza made me nervous (after an engine indication problem at night coming back from Austin).

The Cirrus with it's terrific chute save rate helped with that. BUT, I didn't make the switch until their fatality rate dropped dramatically over the last three years. And it continues to improve. As mentioned, one of the safest pistons you can fly, statistically, now.

And, yes, I fly at night and in IMC more, and more comfortably. But I flew in it in the Bo, as well. And with never a fatality when a chute is pulled over 1k ft, and below Vne, that brought warm fluffy feelings.

Hold on. I'm getting to your point.

Is it the chute that made it the safest? No. Did it help. Yes. What changed three years ago? Training.

So... I bought the Cirrus because of the safety that had been demonstrated in the airframe. Because of that, I bought in to the CULTURE of safety that is now present within the owner group. After a few hundred hours in 182's, and 600 hours in the Bonanza flying in all kinds of weather, I still took a 5 day course from a Platinum CSIP (Cirrus Super Trainer). Because that's what the Cirrus safety culture says to do. If I wanted the results, I had to buy in to it all.

If you read COPA, now, there is much less about the parachute, but much about the safety of flying. Much more so there, than here. The level of participation in CPPP is more than twice that of BPPP (or BPT). And they just started a new initiative to double that.

I believe the stats continue to improve because more people are attracted to the plane because of the increased safety record. If that's what attracts them, and they buy into the culture of safety training, than it makes a difference.

As fatalities have gone down, pulls have gone up. I think it's a demonstrative difference.

But it wasn't until training was emphasized that the numbers became impressive.

Culture, or airframe? A bit of both, but more culture.

Not that different than the MU-2, I would assume.

So, yes, I think a choice in an aircraft can make a difference. And the aircraft itself, sometimes, can make a small difference. But, although subtle, the choice and not the aircraft, can be more the determiner.

Now you fly in riskier conditions with comfort.


21 fatal accidents in the last 3 years.

37 fatal accidents in the 3 years prior to that.

It's a start.


I'm not sure what that means. The plane isn't the cause of these accidents generally, so it isn't the issue. So how do you know the plane is safer than any other?


The "warm fluffy feelings" is the danger.


Excellent, that is the right emphasis. A good pilot never needs the chute because they have avoided the situation that requires it.


I find that uncorrelated so far. If training to avoid dangerous situations was working, we should see BOTH chute pulls and fatal accidents decline. What the "pull early, pull often" training mantra has done is simply lowered the bar for pilots to consider themselves in danger. I don't think it has done much to helping pilots AVOID danger.

In other words, the training program still maintains its central religion that the chute saves all.


Maybe superficially, it may seem so, but deep down, the philosophy is opposite. We train to avoid danger, not to pull handles when it comes upon us unaware.

Mike C.

If it's only that, that means the pulling often is the cause of the success; therefore, the chute is making the Cirrus safer. But I know you don't believe that, and I think it's a contributor, but not the main contributor.

I listed several where the chute worked and the alternative was a crap shoot. Yes, some of them would have saved themselves. Some wouldn't. But c'mon, Mike, aren't you somewhat impressed, or at leased surprised, that 50 out of 50 chute pulls over 1k ft and below Vne have resulted in no fatalities?

Yeah, pilots have pulled when they've been stupid. In other airframes, they've been stupid and died. Cirrus, too; but less so, since the chute is utilized more.

And that's natural. The more successful pulls there are, the more pilots trust it, rather than trying to save the plane themselves. Stupid OR unlucky.

The Breiling reports are several hundreds of dollars each. I have to wonder if Westair was allowed to PDF it and put it up for download on their web site.

The hour usage estimates I guess you could figure out based on aircraft for sale data (look at the Total Time and the Year of Manufacturing, get an average, figure out some kind of reasonable fleet size per year... get a decent hours flown).

I am skeptical of some of the data in that report. The number of "active" PC-12s for example is reported at 794 when there where probably 1,200 PC-12s out there when the report was written.

I don't know if Breiling is looking at safety improvements over time. The MU-2 SFAR 108 has made a huge difference for that type... having gone through that training myself I can understand without a doubt why it makes you a safer pilot.

While Mike C. has said that he thinks Inhofe would still be alive had he had simulator training, I think that he would still be alive had its insurance provider required some hours of mentoring. My current mentor had to do 15 hours of mentoring on the MU-2... this for a guy with 15,500 hours including 2,000 hours on turboprops and about 13,000 hours on jets and hundreds of hours of recent Twin Cessna time.

-Pascal

No. I fly in the same conditions with more comfort.

As far as I can tell, Breiling reports cover the entire time period the type existed.

Net effect is that older airframes include decades old accidents back when there was no GPS, synth viz, older practices, weaker procedures, less simulators, weak training, etc. SO new airframes look better simply because they weren't flown during the old times.

So none of Breiling's numbers are all that useful today.

Mike C.