I'll cross post from another thread a bit, since Mike seems to have come with one mission and carrying to all threads....

He has altered his statement a bit from being an unsafe plane to, ...explanation of why so many Cirrus pilots get into fatal situations.

Fatal situations? Like in ice in a FIKI plane? In a twin when not over an airport? We've provided numerous examples and could keep going.

What makes it a fatal situation if one guy in a twin normally makes a RW, and one guy in a Cirrus normally (always when above 1k ft and below Vne, so far) walks away from a chute pull? Just because you prefer one doesn't make the other wrong. Despite his objection to calling them saves, that's what they both are.

Really - the main thing I'm concerned with is what is safest for me.

The argument comes down to one thing. Everything else is superfluous.

The Cirrus has a fatality rate of 0.82 fatalities per 100k hours over 36 months. 0.32 over 12 months. Show me a travel piston plane fatality rate that's better.

The statistics improved with a new training program, AND an increased use of chute.

Mike has ONE example that he will bring up - the Corvalis. I think he gets this from a dealer that put out a flier with some stats on it that have been proven wrong. (Although the Corvalis does have a good record. It's also a very small sampling. Still - show me the fatalities per 100k hours in it, Mike.)

He is right with the core of his preaching - it is the pilot that makes the most difference. He just can't, for some reason, give the 50 for 50 chute saves any credit.

What evidence? There is evidence that Cirrus used to have higher accident rate than comparable aircraft in it's early days. Where is the evidence that this had anything to do with the chute?

As for extending utility - that's a legitimate thing to say. The key is knowing which situations it's extended utility applies to. Personally, I don't have a problem flying single engine at night or over low IFR. I know there is risk, but chose to accept it based on low probability of engine failure. So for me, chute would not extend utility, it would enhance safety. Others are not comfortable with these kinds of operations in single engine without a chute. For them, chute would indeed extend utility, and so it should.

Now, if someone decides that chute is going to help them in icing or thunderstorms - well, that person does not have mental capacity to be flying anything other than a kite and will find a way to kill themselves one way or another.

Actually, Mike, there have been two. One at Indianapolis, IN, and one in Jamaica, both in 2006. See the NTSB report for the Indianapolis CAPS pull here.

Cheers
Rick

In the interest of injecting some realism into this thread, let me opine in response to this question. Of course, we'll never know because those pilots are dead and not available for Mike's cross-examination.

However, first, I'd like to address the number of fatal situations comment. Turns out that the NTSB has investigated a lower proportion of Cirrus events, by about half, than the GA fleet. Data for this chart comes from the NTSB database, NTSB reviews of civil aviation accidents, and COPA data on Cirrus fleet hours.


To me, that's a surprising result. Furthermore, when you look at the fatal Cirrus investigations, the Cirrus rate hovers around the GA rate until the past year when it drops substantially. Note that Cirrus fleet hours have been derated to accommodate the US-centric entries in the NTSB database.

Now turning to the central question, why do so many Cirrus fatal accidents not use the chute?

By my estimation, more than half, about 54%, of the 106 Cirrus fatal accidents involved scenarios where other pilots had deployed the CAPS parachute system and all aboard lived. That was about 120 people who died when the accident pilot had a good or great chance of surviving with a chute pull.

In similar bad situations, some pilots pulled and all lived, other pilots didn't pull and all died.

Through extensive analysis and exploration of aviation risk management issues, the conventional wisdom emerged in the COPA community that pilots needed to do much more than tell folks they had a parachute in case something goes really wrong. Ironically, Cory Lidle was interviewed in his Cessna and said exactly that just a couple of months before he and his instructor died without pulling the red CAPS handle.

Just like the military aviation community needed to inspect for adherence to the ejection seat criteria, the Cirrus community now inspects for adherence to the use of the CAPS parachute system. Lose control = pull CAPS. Off-airport landing = pull CAPS. Disorientation, incapacitation, loss of engine power, mid-air collision = pull CAPS.

What we see for the past three years reflects a substantial reduction in fatal accidents and an increase in CAPS pulls to avoid off-airport landings.

Cheers
Rick

Why are piston saves becoming important

Agree totally. And it's the ego that gets stuck. Mike C has had some good intelligent points, but guess what, others have to that support the plane. It's almost like Cirrus turned him down for a job or something. Anyway, one loses credibility over time like this.

Why does someone disagreeing with you have to be about ego?

I disagree with you and I can assure it has nothing to do with ego?

We are all just voicing opinions. Do you expect me to change my mind based on your opinion?

Actually, Mike, there have been two. One at Indianapolis, IN, and one in Jamaica, both in 2006. See the NTSB report for the Indianapolis CAPS pull here.

What is an "event"?


Who made the chart?

Can you provide us with the raw data used and methodology?


What is the difference between a "fatal Cirrus investigation" and a "fatal accident"?

These subtle changes in terminology are concerning since it can hide various "definitions".


Very good question.

A fundamental aspect of the chute is that it isn't easy to know when to use it. That makes the benefit less as it requires a complex and QUICK assessment of your situation from a pilot already under duress. In a good number of cases, the pilot's own poor judgment got him here, so why would his judgment clear up in time to use the chute? In some cases, like spatial disorientation, by the time you figure out what is gong on, it is too late.


I'm surprised it is that low. I wouldn't have argued that as many as 75% of all Cirrus fatal accidents were reasonably preventable with the chute had the pilot magically KNOWN what was about to happen.

It is EASY, in hindsight, to point to a moment when the chute COULD have been used. It is much harder in the moment.

In my mind, almost every fatal accident is a chute "system" failure. The pilot is part of the "system" and is necessary to make it work.


I don't understand. Are you saying passengers should be told about the chute and they should be activating it more often?

Pilots already can't make the chute pull decision properly enough, there is no way a passenger can be making it with any better reliability.


I am suspicious about the mixing of NTSB accident counts and COPA/Cirrus provided fleet hours. If the FAA is underestimating SR flying hours, then they are DOING THE SAME THING to other types. So just being "the same" as other planes is actually not when correcting for this difference in treatment.

Mike C.

The FAA do not estimate SR flying hours. They estimate flying hours by class only (single engine piston, multi-engine piston, turboprop, jet etc). See p55 here for example: (first document linked) https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/he ... 2014-2034/



So, to compare Cirrus accident rates against the average for Single Engine Piston aircraft, Rick counts Cirrus accidents and uses data on Cirrus hours. That seems a better method than using Cirrus accidents and average Single Engine Piston fleet hours. No-one is saying that the FAA underestimate the Single Engine Piston fleet hours, they just don't estimate Cirrus hours. So Rick uses what seems a pretty reasonable method for Cirrus hours. If he didn't, he'd be vulnerable to the obvious point that Cirrus hours may not be the same as the Single Engine Piston average. For example, a critic might have considered the FAA average hours heavily weighted by training and rental aircraft flying hundreds of hours per year, whereas Cirrus tend to be more privately operated. Rather than being "suspicious", Rick's method seems to me to be the best way to provide some data in the discussion about Cirrus safety.

I don't understand that. The Chute is a situation-specific "system", like TCAS or EGPWS, or the stall warning horn, which also require a pilot as part of the system (to respond to a warning). What totally autonomous safety systems are there? I guess it's intended for airframe failures, loss of control which can't be safely recovered, incapacitation and off-airport landings over hostile terrain. It obviously has no relevance in fatal accident scenarios like Controlled Flight into Terrain or low-level stall-spin.

Egos ignore or cannot hear another perspective. They only hear themselves. To say something as one sided as "the chute is deployed when ADM FAILS" is all ego, and absurdly ridiculous. And I'm not picking on anyone: I deal with it : we all deal with it. Marriage is one on one; community's such as BT are more people. Of course internet communities can be fairly bogus. BT works better than others because there is more transparency. One cannot hide under a fictitious name.

Opinions? Sure we all have them. But they are totally worthless without facts to support them. Progress is made when we realize everybody brings something to the table. Egos sound like babbling brooks and go nowhere except to smooth over someone's wound that says they "aren't good enough".

I don't think you,will ever have facts on what a pilot is thinking. Opinions yes but not facts.

It's my opinion that the chute gives a false sense of security that will push pilots into more dangerous positions. Some pilots will understand this others will not.

There will be no way of differentiating the two types of pilots decision. Go or no go. This is a personal choice. We will never know if the chute influenced the pilots choices.

My liberal little Hollywood ass will join NRA today if I'm personally allowed to shoot this thread in the head for good.

Lord have mercy upon my poor soul.

Adam, approved as requested, as long as you use one of these.

http://www.kimberamerica.com/1911/ultra ... a-carry-ii