[quote="Might be better off sucking up the gear and fishing for the runway and then find a new plane later.[/quote]
I have practiced emergency 0/0 approaches under the hood with an instructor referencing only the synthetic vision system. The landings are not pretty, but they generally work. I’d leave my gear down. You may well land on the runway, or at least the relatively flat airport environment. The gear will absorb some energy and in an MU-2, is very strong and quite “stubby” so it might even stay under the fuselage while plowing through small bumps, ditches and VASI lights etc.

Great points all of them. Personal minimums are just that personal.

For me they will change for simple things like how much I have flown lately or Has it all been in clear weather.

Because of that I might choose to add more fuel and choose an airport with an easier approach.

Most of my personal minimums seem to come into play during flight planning. Once the flight is on, I doubt I would fly an approach and break it off before minimums. If I did break off an approach for some reason I would consider that ADM.

What’s the difference between ADM and personal minimums. Good question they do overlap.

For me a personal minimums, is something like “it’s been a while I want at least a 4000ft runway.

ADM is something like “I am staying high because of the weather in the arrival area”

I also agree that some decisions, like should you feather an engine or just let it NTS under a 1000ft and continue approach seems different than a personal minimum.

I guess you could call that a personal SOP!

9 pages from one video. Where's the next one?

They are generally boring. Nothing interesting happens.

This one was not due to the weather.

Mike C.

They are generally boring. Nothing interesting happens.

This one was not due to the weather.

Mike C.

Yeah, definitely fun to watch.

Some “how to...” videos would be awesome as well! Haven’t checked YouTube in awhile, but I don’t recall seeing any videos about the preflight, start-up, run up, fueling, etc... sequences.

Might be a bear to make and edit, though, but sure would be informative.

Landing KCEF:

[youtube]https://youtu.be/Rd4pKNT4dkU[/youtube]

First part of the video is passing over KBAF.

KCEF is Westover, formerly military only now dual use. Hardly any traffic.

Notable feature is a 300 ft wide by 12,000 ft runway.

300 ft wide, think about that. They painted a 150 ft wide runway on it for reference. This is the widest runway I have ever landed on.

This video has audio problems from the source recording. Intermittent connection, and also improper audio levels. I've taken steps to rectify that in future videos.

Also, I am displaying the Garmin recorded ground speed and altitude. As you can see, the altitude behaves insanely and is not accurate. Don't know why. I have since done a firmware upgrade to the camera and hope that fixes it since altitude would be a nice thing to have correct.

I didn't leave it in the video, but the taxi takes you past lots of derelict hangars that look like they use to hold very large airplanes from decades ago.

If I am in the New England area and everywhere is zero zero weather, I am landing at KCEF. The runway is so large you will very likely get on it in one piece without seeing it.

Mike C.

Okay, here's the setup:

ATIS says 1100 overcast, 1.75 mile visibility, light rain, mist.

Approach is 345 ft MDA, 1 mile visibility.

Engine fails at 800 ft. This is what you see at that moment:

Continue or abort?

Note that this is already below ATIS ceiling report. Hmm. Now you know the ATIS report is wrong. But how wrong?

In my default strategy, I abort. At 800 ft, I have ample speed and altitude to be imperfect on handling the engine out and go around. I can then calmly reassess the weather, runway, airport, winds, emergency services, facilities, etc, for my upcoming SE landing. I have the opportunity to eliminate or reduce various risk factors. I have the time to brief my passengers and prepare them for the event as well.

I also have the option to "fix" the engine if I can positively determine it was something that is fixable. Say it flamed out because of heavy rain or ice ingestion and I didn't have auto ignition turned on like I was supposed to. Doh! Okay, abort, do an airstart, come back in two engine, this time with auto ignition enabled, of course.

There have to be extenuating circumstance before I will push on down the slope after an engine failure in IMC. Fire, fuel exhaustion, structural failure, etc. These are uncommon circumstances, however, coupled with an engine failure, though not unheard of.

And yes, I have practiced both ways numerous times in the sim and in the airplane itself. It isn't about whether I CAN do it, it is about doing the safest thing I SHOULD do.

Mike C.

That tells us doing a single engine missed at 350 ft AGL is more dangerous than doing it at 800 AGL, far less margin for error.

Thus my strategy is confirmed. Since it is high risk, and since I am potentially facing an approach below minimums (I already know the ATIS is wrong, BTW), then executing the most difficult part before it gets worse and then seeking a less difficult option.

A missed at 800 ft on the glideslope is fairly easy, I only have to concentrate on the go around, and not the runway visual search at the same time.

What you are suggesting is making the situation more extreme, more risky, and THEN executing the missed. You have both argued that going missed is dangerous, and that you should do it at a lower altitude. Seems mixed up to me.

You should ALWAYS presume the missed. In that case, going around and then seeking an airport with a longer runway and better weather while one engine out seems prudent.


You don't know the weather is above minimums. You have presumed that at the decision point which is setting you up for a bad moment.


My strategy is not about avoiding what I can't do, it is about making it as easy as possible to avoid needing all my skills.

A superior pilot uses their superior judgment to avoid those situations requiring their superior skill.

In my judgment, having an engine failure on an approach where getting in is UNCERTAIN, and the stated ceiling is KNOWN wrong, I would go around and reevaluate before I get critically low.


It is a judgment call every pilot can make.

Both you and Steve have implied my decision not to fly to minimums as some sort of lack of proficiency. It is not. It is very carefully evaluated judgment.

Mike C.

That tells us doing a single engine missed at 350 ft AGL is more dangerous than doing it at 800 AGL, far less margin for error.

Thus my strategy is confirmed. Since it is high risk, and since I am potentially facing an approach below minimums (I already know the ATIS is wrong, BTW), then executing the most difficult part before it gets worse and then seeking a less difficult option.

A missed at 800 ft on the glideslope is fairly easy, I only have to concentrate on the go around, and not the runway visual search at the same time.

What you are suggesting is making the situation more extreme, more risky, and THEN executing the missed. You have both argued that going missed is dangerous, and that you should do it at a lower altitude. Seems mixed up to me.

You should ALWAYS presume the missed. In that case, going around and then seeking an airport with a longer runway and better weather while one engine out seems prudent.


You don't know the weather is above minimums. You have presumed that at the decision point which is setting you up for a bad moment.


My strategy is not about avoiding what I can't do, it is about making it as easy as possible to avoid needing all my skills.

A superior pilot uses their superior judgment to avoid those situations requiring their superior skill.

In my judgment, having an engine failure on an approach where getting in is UNCERTAIN, and the stated ceiling is KNOWN wrong, I would go around and reevaluate before I get critically low.


It is a judgment call every pilot can make.

Both you and Steve have implied my decision not to fly to minimums as some sort of lack of proficiency. It is not. It is very carefully evaluated judgment.

Mike C.

It isn't an issue of proficiency. It is choosing a plan of least risk.

Do you tell a pilot who chooses a 5000 ft runway instead of 3000 ft runway that he lacks skills? Tell him he is a wimp?

No, of course not. Instead you compliment them on selecting a course of action that had more safety margin.

That's the case here. Facing an approach with uncertain outcome, I'd prefer to abort with an engine failure early before putting myself into a more dire and critical situation such an a missed at minimums in heavy rain. There are other airports, with longer runways, with different weather, where I can land.


At the point of postulated engine failure, 800 ft, I already know the ATIS report is WRONG. It said 1100 overcast, and I am in solid IMC at 800 ft. At that point, noting in the ATIS can be trusted. I really don't know that I will get in.

In actual fact, the approach I videoed went to MINIMUMS. I was probably 2-3 seconds away from going missed. It turned out I did NOT have plenty of weather margin.


It turned a possible single engine miss at low minimums into one done at much higher altitude where I can reevaluate my next steps.

It is precisely because I have confidence in my ability and my aircraft's performance that I know going missed is the safer path.

You can take it down to minimums if you want, that's your choice. There are conditions I would, too. Not this case.

Again, use your superior judgment to avoid needing your superior skills. Fly to maintain the largest excess of ability over necessity.

Mike C.

It isn't an issue of proficiency. It is choosing a plan of least risk.

Do you tell a pilot who chooses a 5000 ft runway instead of 3000 ft runway that he lacks skills? Tell him he is a wimp?

No, of course not. Instead you compliment them on selecting a course of action that had more safety margin.

That's the case here. Facing an approach with uncertain outcome, I'd prefer to abort with an engine failure early before putting myself into a more dire and critical situation such an a missed at minimums in heavy rain. There are other airports, with longer runways, with different weather, where I can land.


At the point of postulated engine failure, 800 ft, I already know the ATIS report is WRONG. It said 1100 overcast, and I am in solid IMC at 800 ft. At that point, noting in the ATIS can be trusted. I really don't know that I will get in.

In actual fact, the approach I videoed went to MINIMUMS. I was probably 2-3 seconds away from going missed. It turned out I did NOT have plenty of weather margin.


It turned a possible single engine miss at low minimums into one done at much higher altitude where I can reevaluate my next steps.

It is precisely because I have confidence in my ability and my aircraft's performance that I know going missed is the safer path.

You can take it down to minimums if you want, that's your choice. There are conditions I would, too. Not this case.

Again, use your superior judgment to avoid needing your superior skills. Fly to maintain the largest excess of ability over necessity.

Mike C.

It takes the same skill to to do a SE GA at 800ft as it does at 200ft.

You are going to land somewhere anyway? How far are you willing to fly to find weather that meet your personal minimums?

A SE GA is something you try and avoid breaking off an approach early seems crazy.

For an airplane that has adequate engine-out climb performance, I agree with you Steve. Not pertinent to the MU2, but some planes won't go around with engine(s) out, and should look for better weather at their alternate, not even commencing an approach to minimums if it can be avoided.

For the 747 with two engines out, you are considered committed when the gear goes down. Co-pilots aren't even required to demonstrate a two-engine approach. If you get low and slow in that scenario, it's all over.

I would apply that philosophy to an anemic light twin.

Quite the contrary, I don't want to perform one with uncertain weather, in heavy rain, near the ground.

Your strategy makes the worst case scenario much worse, which is a single engine missed at minimums.


If that is due to an actual engine failure on glideslope, the checkride is over regardless and I am doing whatever I feel is safest to get on the ground, including an early missed if I feel that is the right thing to do.

If that occurs in a sim, I'll take it to minimums and execute the missed if indicated.


ONE MORE TIME: THE WEATHER WAS WRONG.

ATIS said 1100 overcast 1.75 miles.

Actual was 350 overcast, 1 mile, at minimums for the approach.

For some reason you keep missing that point.


You evaluation is wrong. Here is the view I had at the MAP just as I call the runway in sight:

Notice we are skimming along the bottom of the clouds and you can't hardly see the runway at all.

This occurs exactly 25 seconds before crossing the runway threshold. I average 125 knots along that path. That works out to exactly 1 statute mile to the runway threshold. That is the minimum visibility for the RNAV GPS 19 approach. I was right at MINIMUMS.

I was literally a second or two away from going missed. My right hand was getting ready to push the power levers.


Then you should now agree this was close, indeed RIGHT AT MINIMUMS.

And that still misses the main point, you CANNOT ASSUME you will make it in. KFRG could have been below minimums, and probably was from time to time as bands of clouds and showers passed through.

At this point, you have all the evidence I got. You can make an an entirely different decision than me and that's fine, but try not to distort what the actual facts are.

If you are single engine, you do not want to give up airspeed or altitude until you are pretty sure you can land. In this scenario, landing was very far from assured.

Mike C.