The 1974 model year got the turbo access panel. Earlier planes can be modified to match that configuration. It is worth looking at just pulling the engine to do the turbo otherwise.

To the best of my knowlege the 1960 and 1961 fuel systems are identical or nearly identical.

I have never seen a 1960 with the larger tanks, although I believe I have seen several 1961 210A models with the 40 gal bladders.

Once you have the turbo(s) you might as well have pressurization!

The insurance/training requirement may go up a bit. The typical maintenance impacts are small, and usually limited to the door seal and the cost of windows if you have to replace one.

Hot off the press

https://public-inspection.federalregist ... -02986.pdf

Now that could be a game changer.

More data on the accident that stimulated this AD:

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/225475
https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/f ... -final.pdf

Some key points:

The airplane was involved in low level survey. It had about 6000 hours prior to this work, and then failed about 6200 hours after low level survey work.

Low level survey work creates a lot of fatigue in structures because the plane spends basically its entire flight time in bumpy air. These hours cause fatigue damage at a rate many multiples of "normal" flying.

As it is, 12000 hours is up there in 210 time, probably 95% of 210 shave less.

In addition the plane was modified with extended fuel wing tip tanks that increase the wing span 26 inches. This further increases the spar loads by moving the lateral center of lift outward and increasing the bending moment on the spar. Even small increases in spar bending drastically reduce fatigue lifetime.

Further, the plane was modified with a magnetometer tail boom and various equipment making it operate at some increased weights.

This looks like the perfect recipe for breaking a wing off. Make the plane heavy, fly it low to the ground, increase the wing span, and then fly it for 12000 hours. No normal 210 will have this fatigue exposure.

Once again, the FAA can't understand the impact of the use case on fatigue issues. They messed up on the 402 wing spar AD for the exact same reason, those that flew Grand Canyon sight seeing flights. How you use the airplane matters and the FAA can't seem to understand that.

Mike C.

They did apply that logic to the PA-28 spar inspection

That's not accurate.

First, John was a diabetic. But, after his younger son, Steven, committed suicide, John lost interest in living and let his diabetes take him... sort of his own suicide by omission.

CPA had issues, including having their website hacked and held hostage for ransom, which they did not pay. CPA is still run by John's ex-wife, Kris Long, and they still publish the monthly magazine... and have built a new website. Kris moved back to Oklahoma, and runs the enterprise from there, but like so many businesses these days, it's mostly virtual anyway. CPA still has talent on tap, like Paul New mentioned in this thread.


That is right; they're back at offering hands-on technical sessions on the various Cessna models, etc.

Paul

Not to bust on our friends from down under, but sure seems like a lot of ADs come out of incidents or accidents in Australia, despite having what some regard as an onerous regulating authority.

I am under the impression that Australia focuses more on general aviation structural fatigue issues than other authorities. I think they have life limits on some planes that the FAA doesn't.

Can't understand, or doesn't care. "Plane go down, we make papers", may be just as complicated as it gets. You seem keep expecting the FAA to be interested in keeping GA pilots (as to their practices in medical certification) and GA airplanes (as to their practices in aircraft maintenance and ongoing airworthiness) flying.

Why do you think that?

If I were king, I'd peel you out of engineering and make you the head of the FAA. We'd end up safer, more reliable and cheaper, all at once.